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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGES THROUGH MARKET AND HEALTH IMPACTS 
 
SEMPTEMBER 2018 
 
KELLY LEIGH HELLMAN, B.A., ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
M.A., ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Jamie Mullins 
 
 
Establishing effective environmental policies is of considerable importance 
around the world and becoming more crucial as human activities continue to change and 
impact natural resources.  The design of effective policies requires knowledge of the 
mechanisms through which markets and individual behavior respond to environmental 
risks.  The following research focuses on the empirical estimation of such responses in 
the presence of environmental risk to inform policy decisions.  I apply econometric 
methods to a variety of environmental issues, including flooding, environmental 
disasters, and air pollution. My findings provide important information regarding the 
setting of future policies related to each issue.   
In the first chapter, “Estimating the Economic Impact of Stormwater runoff in the 
Allen Creek Watershed,” written with Jeffrey Wagner, Karl Korfmacher, Daniel Lass and 
Bríd Gleeson Hanna, we develop an economic model for stormwater runoff control to 
quantify one important part of the tradeoff between the desirability of development 
versus the consequential environmental challenges and economic costs associated with 
increased flooding risk.  Developing a theoretical model and illustrating its application in 
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the Allen Creek watershed, we account for heterogeneity in each parcel-level generation 
of stormwater runoff to estimate the marginal implicit price of additional stormwater 
runoff due to development on downstream property values. We translate this value to a 
marginal damage figure specific to our study area and compare our results with a relevant 
abatement cost estimate.  Our comparison suggests a general result that policies 
encouraging upstream abatement measures, such as retention ponds, are likely to be 
economically efficient. 
The second chapter, “Information and Environmental Disasters: Valuing Public 
Perception Regarding the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” written with Patrick Walsh, 
quantifies the value of risk-signaling information in the context of shoreline oil wash-ups 
from the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill.  We analyze sale price and volume 
responses in Hillsborough County, Florida, which ultimately experienced no wash-ups.  
This chapter provides insight on the types of information that are salient for the 
capitalization of perceived risk into home values and highlights an additional avenue for 
economic losses from environmental catastrophes that has often been overlooked.  Our 
results suggest that the net impact of the heightened risk of oil wash-ups on coastal 
homes was a ~4% reduction in sale prices between two and eight months after the DWH 
oil spill, with the largest impact of a ~7% reduction in prices occurring in August and 
September 2010.  The timing of these price impacts suggests that specifically relevant 
information regarding risk, coming from a source of authority is critical in driving risk 
perceptions and ultimate price effects in the real estate market.  Finally, our results 
suggest a total capitalized loss of $4.5 million which highlights the importance of 
considering a more comprehensive definition of damages, specifically accounting for 
ix 
losses associated with public perception of risks, when compensating states and local 
governments, as well as citizens, for losses due to environmental disasters.   
In the final chapter, “Quantifying the Health Effects of Information on Pollution 
Levels in Chile,” written with Jamie Mullins, we analyze a policy implemented by the 
Government of Chile that institutes temporary measures to reduce negative impacts of 
high levels of air pollution in the short run through both emissions restrictions and public 
information campaigns.  This policy includes public announcement of days for which 
pollution is projected to exceed threshold levels, deemed ‘Episodes’.  As Episodes serve 
to both reduce air pollution and inform the public, this chapter separately identifies the 
mortality reducing effects of Episode announcements acting through the channel of 
information and avoidance behavior from the total effect of Episode announcements, 
which includes effects attributable to improved air quality.  We find that, holding PM10 
constant, the estimated impacts of the Episodes’ informational effects have magnitudes 
comparable to the estimated total effects of Episode announcements on the day of and 
two days after an Episode announcement, indicating that information is playing a critical 
role in the reduction of mortality following Episode announcements. Our results suggest 
that little of the observed reduction in mortality following Episodes is attributable to 
lower ambient air pollution in the most immediate days following an announcement, 
despite the fact that air pollution does improve significantly following Episode 
announcements.  These results are important for informing the implementation of short-
term approaches for addressing spikes in air pollution in other major urban centers. 
x 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STORMWATER RUNOFF 
IN THE ALLEN CREEK WATERSHED 
 
with Jeffrey Wagnerb, Daniel Lassa,  Karl Korfmacherc and Bríd Gleeson Hannab 
 
aDepartment of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
bDepartment of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology 
cEnvironmental Science Program, Rochester Institute of Technology 
1.1 Introduction 
The management of urban stormwater runoff is of increasing policy concern as 
development, particularly the proliferation of impervious surfaces, increases.  Stormwater 
runoff occurs naturally; however, like many natural processes, stormwater flow can be 
affected by human activities.  Changes in land use, specifically the conversion of natural 
landscapes to urbanized areas, have been found to significantly impact stormwater flow.  
Increased impervious surface area (such as roofs and pavement) in watersheds has been 
linked to changes in both the type and magnitude of stormwater flow.  Watersheds 
dominated by a subsurface stormflow regime prior to urbanization experience an increase 
in runoff generated by overland flow due to increased imperviousness.  Overland flow 
occurs when the soil infiltration capacity and depression storage are exceeded.  Increased 
overland flow results in greater and more rapidly forming peak flows, or large volumes of 
water being delivered to the stream channel over a short period of time, and lower 
baseflow, which is water that flows through the soil to sustain streams over time (Dunne 
and Leopold 1978). 
These changes to the natural system have implications for both the water quality 
and quantity in a receiving water body.  The amplification of peak flows and creation of 
new peak events can lead to channel overflow, causing the surrounding land area to 
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flood, especially downstream (Booth 1991 and Paul and Meyer 2001).  Increased 
flooding can have detrimental effects on riparian areas that are not adapted to a high 
frequency of flooding.  Increased peak flows alter the stream channel and cause visible 
physical degradation as a result of changes in sedimentation and erosion patterns, and 
decreased baseflow impacts aquatic organisms in the stream.  Additionally, water quality 
may decline in urban streams due to the large quantity of incoming runoff carrying urban 
pollutants that may not experience the intense filtration that occurs during percolation 
through the soil (House et al. 1993 and Paul and Meyer 2001). 
 In economic terms, the existence of damage from uncontrolled stormwater runoff 
implies that the privately optimal rate of runoff exceeds the socially efficient rate of 
runoff.  In the absence of constraints, private parties that could abate runoff will only do 
so to the extent that they privately benefit from their abatement activities.  Since runoff 
flows downstream, upstream developers and homeowners have little financial incentive 
to abate runoff that causes damage to downstream properties.  The absence of constraints 
implies zero marginal costs for increases in runoff coming from one’s property; hence, 
private parties tend to choose zero abatement investment in order to maximize the total 
private benefits of their economic activities (development) that increase runoff volumes. 
While abating urban stormwater runoff has both ecological and economic aspects 
that must be considered in an optimal management strategy, our study focuses on the 
economic property damage aspects.  We adapt the basic economic model for pollution 
control to stormwater management.  This model indicates that the economically efficient 
volume of runoff to abate in a watershed is a level that equates the marginal property 
damage avoided to the marginal abatement cost.  This model can be used to inform 
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development decisions in a watershed.  Given the optimal volume of runoff abatement, 
planners can determine whether the abatement burden required to mitigate additional 
development is both technically feasible and not so costly that it overwhelms the 
economic benefits of the development. 
Stormwater runoff can be controlled using centralized methods, decentralized 
methods, or a combination of both.  Centralized control methods include large-scale 
efforts that are typically built downstream, like the creation of wastewater treatment 
plants and city sewage or tunnel systems.  In contrast, decentralized control methods, 
such as adoption of site-specific best management practices (BMPs), focus on smaller 
scale, dispersed mitigation efforts.  BMPs help decrease the volume of stormwater runoff 
downstream via upstream stormwater retention, promoting soil infiltration and improving 
water quality by facilitating vegetative filtration.  These technologies can also present a 
cost-effective solution to runoff abatement (Braden and Ando 2012 and Cutter et al. 
2008). 
The costs associated with various abatement technologies include construction, 
operation, maintenance, and land costs.  While the literature agrees the value of land will 
have the largest impact on the cost-effectiveness of various abatement technologies, 
many studies estimate only the construction, operation and maintenance costs of different 
BMPs (Thurston et al. 2003, Landphair 2001, Weiss and Gulliver and Erickson 2012).  
Thurston et al. (2003) and Weiss, Gulliver and Erickson (2012) use Cobb-Douglas 
functional forms to determine construction costs as a function of volume of stormwater 
abated.  For most of the BMPs considered, the marginal construction costs vary 
substantially and decrease as volume abated increases.  However, when including an 
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estimate for the opportunity cost of land, Thurston (2006) and Cutter et al. (2008) show 
that the cost-effectiveness of decentralized BMPs relative to centralized methods depends 
largely on the value of the land being used for abatement.   
 On the stormwater damages side of the ledger, multiple studies show that there are 
economic benefits from improving water quality.  For example, Poor, Pessagno and Paul 
(2007) use a hedonic model and estimate that reductions in water quality due to one 
milligram per liter increases in total suspended solids and dissolved inorganic nitrogen 
have respective negative impacts of 0.5% and 8% on home values.  Using a similar 
hedonic model but correcting for spatial autocorrelation, Walsh, Milon and Scrogin 
(2011) find that residential stormwater management and aquatic plant control programs 
can increase home values by 3-5%.  An analysis by Netusil, Kincaid, and Chang (2014) is 
closely related to our study in that they investigate how water quality in creeks near 
residential property affects property values; using a hedonic price model, they find that 
water quality does affect residential property values and that the effect generally 
dissipates, as expected, with distance from the creek.   
 Consistent with the water quality literature, Streiner and Loomis (1995) and Sander, 
Polasky and Haight (2010) use hedonic models to estimate the value of stormwater 
quantity mitigation.  While Streiner and Loomis (1995) find that the effect of flood 
control is positive and worth 5% of property values, Sander, Polasky and Haight (2010) 
find a much smaller positive impact on property values (0.29-0.48%) resulting from a 
10% increase in vegetative cover within close proximity to homes.  Similarly, Kadish and 
Netusil (2012) examine the relationship between land cover types – trees, shrubs, water 
and impervious surface areas – and sale prices of single-family residences in the areas 
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surrounding these properties.  With regard to tree canopy, they find that increasing 
canopy increases a home’s sale value, but this benefit is less than the discounted 
estimated cost of planting and caring for trees on a given property.  They note, however, 
that consideration of additional benefits from each tree, such as stormwater mitigation, 
may result in incremental social benefits exceeding the incremental social costs.  Finally, 
Braden and Johnston (2004) summarize existing estimates for the value of flood 
reduction and conclude that stormwater mitigation is worth 0-5% of property values 
depending on the home’s location in the floodplain.  Using these estimates from the 
aforementioned paper, Johnston, Braden and Price (2006) study the impact of reducing 
the size of the 100-year flood plain, ultimately determining that the downstream benefit 
to stormwater management is between $40-$620 per developed acre. 
 Our study extends the above literature in two dimensions.  First, while others have 
examined residential economic property damage that arises from relatively infrequent 
floods (i.e. 100-year events), our study estimates property damage from exposure to 
regularly occurring stormwater quantity flows (average annual runoff).  Second, we 
believe ours is the first study to model this relationship in a manner that takes into 
account the parcel-level potential to both attenuate upstream stormwater flow and 
contribute to downstream stormwater flow.  That is, our measure of stormwater runoff is 
at the individual parcel level; it accounts for heterogeneity in each parcel’s generation of 
stormwater runoff.1  We estimate the marginal damage of runoff for a small urbanized 
                                               
1 Rosen’s (1974) seminal paper on hedonic modeling presents the theoretical underpinnings of first and 
second-stage hedonic analyses.  The first stage model relates prices of homes to characteristics of those 
homes to estimate the implicit price functions, while the second-stage uses the marginal implicit prices 
determined in the first stage to trace out the household’s compensated demand curve, or marginal bid 
curve.  At the optimal level of consumption, the marginal implicit price is equal to the marginal bid (Taylor 
2003).  In our study, we make the simplifying assumption that the marginal implicit price of runoff is equal 
to the marginal bid to interpret our first-stage hedonic regression results as estimates of damage. 
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watershed located primarily in the Town of Brighton, Rochester NY.  The Town of 
Brighton is considering impacts that the development of a large area of green space (87 
acres) would have downstream.  Our results help to answer this question by providing an 
estimate for marginal property damage.  Thus, our study helps quantify one important 
part of the tradeoffs communities face when evaluating the desirability of development 
(e.g., raising the tax base) versus the increase in environmental challenges and economic 
costs that may result (e.g., greater harm from stormwater runoff).  
 Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we present our theoretical economic 
model of urban stormwater runoff generation and its abatement.  Our study area and data 
are presented in Section 3.  We then estimate the empirical model in Section 4 and 
discuss the results.  Section 5 presents an application of our results as we compare our 
marginal damage estimate to marginal abatement costs from previous literature.  Finally, 
in Section 6 we discuss our conclusions and directions for future research. 
1.2 The Economic Model 
A fundamental economic challenge faced by urban planners is to balance the costs 
of abating stormwater runoff with the benefits of doing so.  While the abatement cost and 
damage associated with urban stormwater runoff is a function of both quantity and 
quality, and watershed managers must consider both of these aspects of stormwater 
management, the model is simplified so that abatement cost and damage are functions of 
quantity only.  In focusing on the quantity aspect, the model assumes that abating 
stormwater quantity will also indirectly mitigate stormwater quality effects (Laukkanen et 
al., 2009).   
Let the volume of uncontrolled stormwater runoff in the watershed be denoted by 
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!"####.  The planner’s objective is to determine the optimal volume RO ≤ !"####.  Suppose the 
abatement cost A(RO) is a continuous and differentiable function with $%$&' < 0  and $(%$&'( 
≥ 0.2  We represent the damage from !" as a continuous and differentiable function 
D(RO), where $)$&' > 0 and  $()$&'(  ≥ 0.  The planner’s problem is to minimize total costs 
(C(RO)) by choosing the volume of stormwater runoff RO that solves: 
 *+,	 .(!") = 2(!") + 4(!")		                (1.1) 
 
The first-order condition is: 
 $5$&' 	= 	 $%$&' +	 $)$&' 	= 	0		                                                             (1.2) 
          
And the planner optimally chooses RO* where: 
 	- 898:; 	= 	 8<8:;			                                     (1.3) 
 
By the standard assumptions listed above, the first-order condition yields an interior 
unique optimum—i.e., some but not all of the runoff would be abated.     
                                               
2 While we discuss the specific case of continuous abatement costs, complexities of stormwater 
management plans and differences in costs associated with installing BMPs on various types of land in a 
watershed could result in discontinuities.  For instance, a stormwater management plan that uses various 
BMPs and extends widely across a watershed could see jumps in costs at specific volumes upon switching 
to new technologies to abate larger volumes or after the availability of less expensive land for BMP 
installation has been exhausted.   
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Before leaving the theoretical model, we note that the marginal abatement cost 
could in theory be U-shaped rather than monotonically increasing.  This could be the case 
if the abatement technology features economies of scale over some range of RO but 
diseconomies of scale over lower ranges of RO.  These ranges capture both the 
technology per se as well as the opportunity cost of the land being utilized in the 
abatement technology (such as a retention pond).  While the economies of scale from the 
technology itself could dominate the opportunity cost of the land factor at relatively high 
levels of RO ( i.e. low abatement rates) via a retention pond, at some point, we could 
imagine the economies of scale being exhausted and/or overtaken by the opportunity cost 
of land factor as RO falls (i.e. as abatement increases beyond some point).  Our 
theoretical model includes a simplifying assumption that we will be in the upward 
sloping range of the marginal abatement cost function.  Of course, it would be sufficient 
to assume that the second derivative is non-negative.  
1.3 The Study Area and the Data 
The Allen Creek watershed is located in Rochester, New York, in southeastern 
Monroe County as shown in Figure 1.1.  The Allen Creek watershed (USGS Hydrologic 
Unit Code 041401010703) has a drainage area of 30.6 square miles and is part of the 
larger 224 square mile Lake Ontario Central Sub-Basin (Monroe County 2015a).  Allen 
Creek drains into Irondequoit Creek, which drains into Irondequoit Bay that ultimately 
feeds into Lake Ontario.  According to the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the 
Monroe County Department of Health (MCDH), both the annual precipitation volume 
and the frequency of large precipitation events have increased in recent decades in 
Rochester.    
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Figure 1.1:  The Allen Creek watershed study area in Rochester, NY, located in Monroe 
County. 
 
 
 
As a consequence, peak flows have increased while base flows have decreased in urban 
streams.  In particular, Allen Creek has experienced the same number of peak flows 
between 1960-1980 as in 1980-2006; however, the later period experienced seven flows 
that exceeded the rate of any flow in the former period.  Additionally, comparison of base 
flow patterns since 1980 between Allen Creek and other streams located in relatively 
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rural areas revealed a strong decrease in base flows in Allen Creek that were not seen in 
the rural streams (USGS and MCDH 2008).  
 Figure 1.2 shows a detailed view of the Allen Creek watershed and the study area. 
The striped polygon in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 represents an 87-acre plot located in the Town 
of Brighton that currently exists as open, undeveloped land.  Being one of the few 
remaining undeveloped areas in Brighton, this site has been proposed for commercial 
development.  Any change in land use/land cover at this site, specifically the conversion 
of the existing herbaceous landscape to a commercial site, will have the greatest impact 
on properties located downstream from this area.  Thus, this study area is of interest for 
two reasons.  First, we are interested in estimating the marginal property damage to 
downstream properties from current stormwater flows.  Second, we can use the marginal 
property damage estimate to forecast how property damage may increase downstream if 
additional upstream development is approved and stormwater flows consequently 
increase.  The white polygons outlined by dotted lines in Figure 1.2 show the parcels for 
homes included in the sample. These parcels are single-family homes (excluding 
townhomes) located directly downstream from the potential development site to the end 
of the creek (less than four miles).  Allen Creek flows left to right as shown by the arrow 
in Figure 1.1.   
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Figure 1.2:  Detailed view of the study area showing: parcels in the sample, the FEMA 
flood zone, a local park (Corbett’s Glen) and shopping center (Pittsford Plaza) and Allen 
Creek.  
 
 
 
All homes in our sample intersect with the 100-year flood zone as designated by the US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  The hydrological analysis was 
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conducted using ArcGIS 10.2.2 software from ESRI and data from Monroe County for 
the year 2011.  The characteristics of the properties used in our hedonic model are 
publicly accessible through the Monroe County Real Property Portal (Monroe County 
2015b).   
The final dataset of contiguous properties intersecting the FEMA flood zone for 
Allen Creek consists of 182 parcels.  The majority of the residences in the dataset are 
located in the Town of Brighton (131 homes); 29 homes are located in the Town of 
Penfield and 22 homes in the Town of Pittsford.  Since the homes in our study are located 
in a designated high-risk flood area, new homeowners must receive a copy of relevant 
flood maps at the time of purchase, and homeowners requiring a mortgage are federally 
mandated to obtain flood insurance.  Additionally, some mortgage lenders require that a 
homeowner have flood insurance even if the home is not located in a high-risk area 
(FEMA 2017b).  
The Monroe County Real Property Portal provides assessed values of residential 
properties, which are the dependent variable in our hedonic model.  For residential 
properties, each town defines the assessed value as the market value of the home at some 
uniform percentage of value, called the equalization rate (NYSDTF 2015).  Since the 
Towns of Brighton, Pittsford and Penfield all used equalization rates of 100 percent in 
2010, the assessed values used in our model should reflect market value as estimated by 
local assessors (NYSORPTS 2015).  To estimate market value, local assessors account 
for various external and internal property characteristics, including those that may 
influence flooding on a property such as location on a waterfront and soil classification 
(NYSORPS 2002, NYSDTF 2015). We look at a cross-section of home characteristics 
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and assessed values in 2011.  As of 2011, the Towns of Brighton, Pittsford and Penfield 
reported the most recent town-wide reassessments occurred in 2008, 2010 and 2009, 
respectively (Town of Brighton 2016, Town of Penfield 2009 and Town of Pittsford 
2016).  Therefore, we convert all assessed values to 2010 dollars using the US Federal 
Housing Agency’s Housing Price Indices for Rochester, NY metropolitan area (FHFA 
2017).   
For the independent variable of interest, we estimate the annual runoff from each 
parcel using a spreadsheet model based on methods presented by Harbor (1994) and the 
Long-Term Hydrologic Impact Analysis (L-THIA) model (Pandey et al. 2000, Choi et al. 
2003, Purdue 2011, and Ahiablame, Engel and Chaubey 2012), which are based on the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service’s (NRCS) Curve Number (CN) method (SCS 
1986).  Our spreadsheet incorporates 50 years of daily precipitation records for the 
specified area.  We assign a residential CN to each parcel in the sample based on the size 
of the parcel, the hydrologic soil rating (see Table 2-2a from SCS (1986) for predefined 
land use and soil CN combinations), and percentage of impervious land cover.  
Hydrologic soil ratings are obtained from the Monroe County, NY SSURGO 2.2 
database, downloaded from the NRCS Geospatial Data Gateway (NRCS 2015).  CN 
values range from 46 (two acre parcels on A soils) to 92 (an eighth of an acre or less 
parcels on D soils).  Most soils in the area are poorly drained (D) and each parcel is 
intersected with the soils database in ArcGIS to determine area weighted CN values for 
mixed soil parcels.  Using ArcGIS 10.2.2 and L-THIA, we calculate runoff volumes 
coming from each property based on the assigned CN.  This runoff volume represents 
annual excess precipitation not absorbed by the soils and land cover of the parcel.  We 
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then assign each property a number indicating its relative location downstream from the 
potential development site to measure the volume of runoff that potentially accumulates 
at that property from upstream properties.  This generates a sequential variable assigned 
to each parcel that is used to determine the annual cumulative runoff volume passing each 
downstream parcel.  Annual cumulative runoff volume is the sum of all upstream runoff 
volumes plus the current parcel runoff.  This volume reflects runoff losses attributed to 
groundwater recharge, storage, and other losses. 
1.4 The Empirical Model and the Results 
We use a hedonic property model to estimate the marginal implicit cost of an 
additional unit of runoff on a homeowner’s property.  Recent studies utilize such a model 
to measure the change in market property value resulting from changes in nearby water 
quality (Leggett and Bockstael 2000, Poor, Pessagno and Paul 2007, and Netusil, 
Kincaid, and Chang 2014), whereas our model examines the change in assessed property 
value resulting from changes in average annual runoff quantity.  Previous research 
supports the hypothesis that location within a flood zone is a disamenity as it signals 
flood risk to homeowners (Bin, Kruse and Landry 2008 and Nyce et al. 2014).   In 
addition to the information provided by flood zone designation, we expect information on 
the frequency and severity of flooding that a parcel experiences should influence a 
property’s value.  Homeowners can observe site-specific differences in runoff volumes 
during peak events as evidenced by water levels in embankments and their yards. Since 
downstream location in a flood zone is correlated with higher runoff volumes, we use 
runoff volumes to represent the flooding frequency and severity experienced by each 
parcel.  Several floods leading to significant property damage occurred on Allen Creek 
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between 1998 and 2008; therefore, homeowners in our study are likely to have 
experienced flood events on their properties (USGS and MCDH 2008).   
The use of sale value as a proxy for market value of residential properties is more 
common and the preferred measure of value in hedonic models, however, assessed values 
provide an alternative proxy for market value. While there are some potential problems 
associated with using assessed values (see Taylor (2003), for example), in our analysis 
the use of 2011 sale prices for homes located downstream from the potential development 
site and in the floodplain would substantially restrict the number of homes in our sample.  
Since L-THIA incorporates 50 years of precipitation data, we are unable to employ a 
repeat sales approach as we would not be able to capture any variation in the average 
annual runoff variable for relevant sales between 1961 and 2011.  Additionally, 
expanding our cross-section to single family parcels located outside the flood zone 
requires future research in the form of a terrain analysis to construct a measure of runoff.  
We are confident the runoff from homes located in the FEMA flood zone flow to Allen 
Creek; however, without examining further hydrological models, we cannot be certain 
runoff from properties outside the flood zone does not flow to other channels.  Finally, 
our study is focused on balancing the additional cost the Town of Brighton would incur 
from flooding due to development with the additional revenue the town could generate 
from taxing this new development.  Therefore, in estimating the cost of additional runoff 
via a change in assessed home values, we offer the town an estimate of the potential 
reduction in property tax revenues due to increased flooding.  
Typically assessed values are not exactly equal to sale values, which could result 
in measurement error in the dependent variable of hedonic regression.  As Taylor (2003) 
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indicates, measurement error present in the assessed values leads to biased estimates of 
implicit prices when the measurement error is correlated with the control variables.  To 
investigate the implications for using assessed values instead of sale values as the 
dependent variable in our hedonic analysis, we run a simple linear regression with these 
two variables for our area of interest.  Using 48 single-family residence sales for 
properties located along Allen Creek that sold between 2005-2010, we regress the sale 
price for home i in year t (SVit) on the corresponding assessed value reported for home i 
in year t (AVit).   The estimated equation is shown below with standard errors in 
parentheses:   
 =>?@ 		= 	2355	 + 	1.032>?@	       (1.4) 
             (15,282)  (0.054) 
 
The R2 for the model is 0.89 and the slope estimate is not significantly different from 1, 
which suggests using assessed values as the dependent variable should not yield 
significantly different results from using sale prices in our analysis.  It is possible, 
however, that sale prices differed from assessed values after the housing bubble burst in 
2007 in the US.  In this case assessed values may be less volatile during our study period. 
We regress homes’ assessed values on various controls and parcel-specific 
average annual runoff volume in cubic feet.  We assume that assessed value (AV) is a 
function of various home characteristics (X) and the expected annual property damage 
associated with flooding (D), which is a function of average annual runoff volumes (RO).  
Therefore, we have: 
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2> = 2>(F, 4(!"))       (1.5) 
 
Differentiating with respect to runoff volume (RO) and rearranging terms gives us an 
expression for marginal damages: 
 $)$&' = $%H$&' ∙ J$%H$) KLM       (1.6) 
 
Our regression model provides an estimate of the marginal effect of an additional 10,000 
cubic feet of average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime ($%H$&'). To 
obtain an estimate of the marginal annual damages ( $)$&'), we must make an assumption 
about the capitalization of annual damages into home value ($%H$) ), which we discuss later 
in the paper. 
 To estimate the change in assessed value caused by an additional 10,000 cubic 
feet of annual runoff (which represents about a 2% increase in the average annual runoff 
volume coming from each lot, see Table 1.1), we specify a log-linear functional form 
similar to Poor, Pessagno and Paul (2007) and Netusil, Kincaid and Chang (2014).  In 
defining the empirical relationship between the runoff variable and assessed values, we 
run a Box-Cox test.  The test rejects the linear, log-linear and multiplicative inverse 
specifications; however, the log-linear model has the lowest chi-squared value, providing 
relatively more support for this model over the others.  We specify the following hedonic 
model:  
 NO2>? 		= 	P	 +	QMF? 	+ 		QR!"? 	+	S?         (1.7) 
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where LNAVi is the natural log of assessed value for home i in 2010 constant dollars.  The 
parameters to be estimated are α, β1, β2 and εi is a random disturbance term. Xi is a vector 
of characteristics for home i and ROi is the average runoff volume in 10,000 cubic feet 
that is transported by Allen Creek past home i's property annually.  This volume is 
directly related to downstream location on the creek and varies at the parcel level.  For 
instance, lower volumes of runoff are transported past homes located more upstream 
relative to downstream homes.  The variables used in our regression are described and 
summarized in Table 1.1.  
We estimate a number of models using ordinary least squares (OLS) that include 
different controls. In our preferred specification, the structural characteristics include the 
year in which the house was built (YRBUILT), the living area in square feet (LIVING), 
and the yard space on the homeowner’s lot in square feet (YARD).  Additionally, 
quadratic terms for living area and yard space capture the non-linear relationship that 
typically exists due to the diminishing marginal utility of an increase in living area and 
yard space.  Most of the residences are located in the Town of Brighton, but some are 
located in the Town of Pittsford or Penfield.  The dummy variable (PITTSPEN) indicates 
those residences located in the Town of Pittsford or Penfield.  
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Table 1.1:  Descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analysis. 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AV10 Total assessed value (2010 dollars) $280,614 $200,867 $50,000 $1,250,000 
LNAV10 Natural log of total assessed value 12.37 0.55 10.82 14.04 
STORIES Number of floors 1.67 0.45 1 2.5 
BEDS Number of bedrooms  3.63 0.88 1 7 
BATHS Number of full bathrooms  2.04 1.00 1 5 
PITTSPEN 
Location: 1 if in 
Pittsford or Penfield; 
0 if in Brighton 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
YRBUILT Year home was built 1947 19.40 1826 2007 
LIVING Living area (square feet) 2,462 1,134 1,050 7,361 
YARD Yard space (square feet) 29,914 31,730 4,863 249,437 
RO 
Average annual 
volume  of runoff 
from each lot (10,000 
cubic feet) 
466,262 354,768 4,803 1,136,251 
 
 
Recall that the runoff variable (RO) is the average annual runoff volume that is 
transported by Allen Creek past home i's property, based on 50-year precipitation 
records.  Since the hedonic model is log-linear, the effect of increasing runoff on home  
i’s assessed value is QR ∙ ∆2>?.  We evaluate the change in assessed value due to an 
additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff at the average assessed value in the sample.  
We then multiply by our assumed capitalization rate (to be discussed shortly) to get the 
annualized marginal damage of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff and by 182 to 
get the marginal damage to the downstream community.  Because the potential 
development site had yet to be developed by 2010, the results of the hedonic model 
represent the damages due to runoff from the site existing as an herbaceous field.  Thus, 
we follow our estimation of the marginal property damage in the current development 
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state with analysis of what those damages might be, should the upstream site undergo the 
proposed development. 
 
Table 1.2:  Sensitivity of OLS results on cumulative runoff impacts. 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  5.3738 *** 7.1140 *** 10.8303 ***   
(1.9048) (1.9773) (0.0846) 
PITTSPE
N 
 0.1461 ** 0.0646 0.1077 *   
(0.0705) (0.0683) (0.0642) 
STORIES 
 
0.1753 ** 
  
  
(0.0427) 
  
BEDS 
 
-0.0438 ** 
  
  
(0.0191) 
  
BATHS  0.0491 **     
(0.0225) 
YRBUIL
T 
 
0.2702 E -2 *** 0.1894 E -2 *    
(0.9539 E -3) (0.1007 E -2) 
LIVING  0.7327 E -3 *** 0.7712 E -3 *** 0.758 E -3 ***   
(0.635 E -4) (0.591 E -4) (0.607 E -4) 
LIVINSQ  -.0.584 E -7 *** -0.573 E -7 ***. -0.544 E -7 ***   
(0.809 E -8) ((0.834 E -8) (0.866 E -8) 
YARD  0.578 E -5 *** 0.605 E -5 *** 0.552 E -5 ***   
(0.132 E -5) (0.135 E-5) (0.136 E-5)  
YARDQ  -0.182. E -10 *** -0.198 E -10 *** -0.174 E -10 ***   
(0.497 E -11) (0.500 E -11) (0.499 E -11) 
RO  -0.117 E -2 * -0.156 E -2 ** -0.192 E -2 ***   
(0.635 E -3) (0.714 E -3) (0.72 E -3) 
  
 
 
 
Adj. R  0.91 0.90 0.90 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample size is 182 for  
all models, and the runoff variable reflects the marginal effect of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of 
average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level or better.   
** Statistically significant at the 5% level or better.   
  * Statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
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Model estimates using OLS including the indicated controls are presented in 
Table 1.2.  Each model includes heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors as the 
Breusch-Pagan test suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data.   Coefficient 
estimates on the runoff variable are similar across models.  The adjusted R2 values for 
Models 1-3 are nearly identical; however, Model 3 is the most parsimonious.  That 
assessed values are being explained by relatively few exogenous variables is not 
surprising, given the study area spans less than four miles.  Given the use of a relatively 
small area in our analysis, we expect there is likely to be little spatial variation in 
amenities beyond what is captured by the town dummy variable.3  Nevertheless, to ensure 
that spatial dependencies are not driving our results, we explicitly address such spatial 
correlations in the data (as recommended by LeSage and Pace (2009)).   
Using Model 3 as the preferred specification, we test for spatial dependence under 
the assumption of a contiguity-based spatial weight matrix (SWM), which defines parcels 
that share a border as neighbors.  The Moran’s I statistic on the OLS residuals is 
significant at the ten percent level, suggesting that failure to correct for spatial 
autocorrelation could result in inconsistent or inefficient estimates using OLS.  Therefore, 
we estimate the following general spatial model, which contains both a spatial lag term 
and non-spherical error (LeSage and Pace 2009): 
 U = 	VWMU + XQ + Y            (1.8) 													Y = 	ZWRY + S 
                                               
3 We also run models that include additional spatial variables, such as the distance to a nearby park and the 
distance to a main shopping center.  These variables are not statistically significant, and their addition does 
not result in any change in the runoff coefficient.   
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In equation (1.8), Y is the dependent variable, W1 and W2 are SWMs, Z is a matrix of 
exogenous variables (including home characteristics and the runoff variable in our 
model), β is a vector of estimated coefficients associated with Z.  ρ and l are the 
estimated spatial coefficients capturing the spatial lag and non-spherical error term, 
respectively.  ε is a vector of random disturbances distributed i.i.d. normal.  Since our 
data exhibit heteroskedasticity, we estimate this model using generalized spatial two-
stage least squares.  Assuming the same structure for W1 and W2, our results indicate that 
ρ is statistically insignificant while l is statistically significant, suggesting that the data 
generating process is more aptly modeled with a spatial error model. 
Table 1.3 reports the spatial error model coefficient estimates along with those 
from the preferred OLS specification (see Model 3 in Table 1.2).  According to Table 1.3, 
home characteristics, location and runoff are estimated to have important effects on 
assessed values in the spatial model.  All estimated parameters are statistically significant 
at least at the five percent level of significance.  While most homes are located in the 
Town of Brighton, the 51 homes in Pittsford or Penfield are estimated to have 16 percent 
higher assessed values when compared to Brighton assessed values according to the 
spatial error model.4   
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Because the dependent variable is the natural log of assessed home values and the variable in question, 
PITTSPEN, is a dummy variable, (exp(β)-1)*100 is the estimated percentage difference change in assessed 
values for homes in Pittsford and Penfield relative to similar homes in Brighton, where Q is the PITTSPEN 
parameter estimate (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980).   
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Table 1.3:  Hedonic model results estimated using spatial error model  
compared to OLS.  
Variable OLS Spatial Error  
Constant 10.8303 *** 10.8562 ***  
(0.0846) (0.0893) 
PITTSPEN 0.1077 * 0.1526 **  
(0.0642) (0.0741) 
LIVING 0.758 E -3 *** 0.7669 E -3 ***  
(0.607 E -4) (0.621 E -4) 
LIVINGSQ -0.544 E -7 *** -0.589 E -7 ***  
(0.866 E -8) (0.924 E -8) 
YARD 0.552 E -5 *** 0.511 E -5 ***  
(0.136 E-5)  (0.156 E -5) 
YARDSQ -0.174 E -10 *** -0.165 E -10 ***  
(0.499 E -11) (0.563 E -11) 
RO -0.192 E -2 *** -0.235 E -2 ***  
(0.72 E -3) (0.821 E -3) 
Lambda  
 
0.0818 **   
(0.0352) 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample size is 182 
for all models, and the runoff variable reflects the marginal effect of an additional 10,000 cubic 
feet of average annual runoff on the value of the home over its lifetime. 
***   Statistically significant at the 1% level or better.  
**  Statistically significant at the 5% level or better.  
*  Statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
 
 
The positive estimated neighborhood effect likely represents the effects of higher median 
household income in Pittsford and Penfield. Median household incomes in the towns of 
Brighton, Penfield, and Pittsford are $63,353, $78,069, and $104,575, respectively (US 
Census Bureau 2015).  Additionally, the coefficients on the household characteristics 
(living area and yard area) have the expected signs and are of reasonable magnitude.  The 
spatial error model indicates assessed values increase at a decreasing rate for both 
additional living area and yard area.  
The estimated effect of annual stormwater runoff is of primary interest in this 
study.  The estimated marginal damage effect can be used to determine the optimal level 
of stormwater runoff when compared to marginal abatement costs.  As described above, 
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the variable measuring stormwater runoff is a cumulative measure aggregating upstream 
runoff for each property that captures annual excess precipitation not absorbed by the 
soils and land cover of the parcel.  The estimated marginal effect of annual stormwater 
runoff volume on home values is negative.  Table 1.4 summarizes the estimated impact of 
an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual stormwater runoff based on the spatial error 
model estimates.  Row 1 of Table 1.4 represents the estimated impact of an additional 
10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff on assessed value.  
 
Table 1.4:  Estimated impacts of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff.   
  95% Confidence Intervals 
  Spatial Error Lower Limit Upper Limit 
RO Coefficient  -0.235 E -2 *** -0.074 E-2 -0.396 E-2     
Impact on Average Valued 
Home (2010$) -659 -208 -1,111  
   
Damages to Downstream 
Community (2010$) 11,994 3,786 20,220 
    
Downstream Damages per 
10,000 ft3 Due to Additional 
3.94 mil ft3 Runoff (2010$) 
4,725,636 1,491,526 7,966,759 
 
Note: Sample size for all models is 182.  Impact on average valued home is the coefficient 
estimate multiplied by $280,614.  Damages to the downstream community are calculated by 
multiplying the impact on the average valued home by the sample size and then by the 
capitalization rate (-0.10).  Downstream damages due to an additional 3.94 million cubic feet 
of runoff is based on the L-THIA estimate of additional expected runoff beyond current 
conditions if the 87-acre herbaceous field is commercially developed.  This is calculated by 
multiplying the damages to the downstream community by 3.94 million cubic feet of runoff 
(recall the coefficient estimate is in 10,000 cubic feet). 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
                  The spatial error model suggests an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual 
runoff reduces assessed values by about 0.235 percent (the 95% confidence interval is 
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0.074-0.396%).  The effect is statistically significant at the one percent level.  Estimates 
of partial effects on assessed value change with assessed value.  For example, a home 
assessed at $150,000 would have a reduction in value of $353 from an additional 10,000 
cubic feet of annual runoff, and a home assessed at $1,000,000 would have a reduction in 
value of $2350 from an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff.  As indicated by 
row 2 of Table 1.4, the impact of an additional 10,000 cubic feet of annual runoff on 
assessed value for the average valued home ($280,614) is $659. The increasing impact on 
home values is expected as damage to homes with higher assessed values are likely more 
costly to repair.  
The estimated marginal runoff effect is statistically significant, but is the effect 
economically significant?  There are several important considerations when determining 
the economic effects of additional annual runoff.  First, the marginal damage function is 
the aggregate of damage to all properties that will be affected by land-use changes 
upstream. Thus, the marginal damage incurred by all downstream properties (182 homes 
in this analysis) must be aggregated to determine the marginal damage function for the 
project under consideration.  Second, the estimated effect of additional annual runoff 
represents annual marginal damages that have been capitalized into home values.  To 
obtain an estimate of the marginal annual damages ( $)$&'), we assume a capitalization rate 
of 10%, meaning that each additional loss of $10 in home value is equivalent to a $1 
increase in expected annual damages from runoff.  Use of this rate is based on a hedonic 
study by Nyce et al. (2014).  Nyce et al. (2014) find that for homes located in Miami-
Dade County, Florida, a 13.04 percent increase in average annual flood insurance 
premiums results in reduced home values by between $2,316.82-$4,571.45, implying a 
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capitalization rate of between 7 and 14 percent.  This is a relevant measure because an 
annual expected increase in damages due to runoff leads to a permanent change in 
housing value. Our model estimates the permanent change in housing value, which must 
be transformed into an estimate of annual damages.  Thus, we assume the final term in 
equation (1.6) is J$%H$) KLM = -0.10 and use this value to convert the estimate of housing 
value change into an annualized marginal damage value.  
 The estimates of aggregate annual marginal damage to the downstream 
community shown in row 3 of Table 1.4 are the estimated impact on the average 
downstream home’s assessed value (Table 1.4 row 2) multiplied by the number of 
affected properties (182) and the capitalization rate (to create annual values).  After 
accounting for spatial effects, the annual estimated marginal damages for all 182 
downstream homes facing typical stormwater runoff events in this region is nearly 
$12,000 per 10,000 cubic feet of additional runoff (or $1.20 per one cubic foot). 
Confidence interval estimates are also provided. We are 95% confident that the true 
marginal damages of 10,000 cubic feet of additional runoff is contained by the interval 
$3,786 to $20,220. Finally, consider the aggregate damages of developing the upstream 
87-acre parcel.  The estimated downstream damages due to an additional 3.94 million 
cubic feet of runoff shown in Table 1.4 is based on the L-THIA estimate of additional 
expected runoff beyond current conditions if the 87-acre herbaceous field is 
commercially developed.  The estimated damages to the community from an additional 
3.94 million cubic feet of runoff is roughly $4.7 million and the 95% confidence interval 
ranges from $1.5 million to $8.0 million.   
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1. 5 Damage and Abatement Cost Comparison  
While our study does not generate abatement cost estimates, we illustrate the use 
of such an estimate of the marginal annual downstream property damages by comparing 
our estimate to marginal abatement cost data that can be considered roughly comparable 
across communities and across time.  For example, Thurston et al. (2003) report 
construction cost functions for various BMPs estimated by Schueler (1987) and Heaney, 
Sample, and Wright (2002).  For cost comparisons, we consider a scenario in which the 
Town of Brighton requires the installation of a 100,000-cubic foot capacity retention 
pond on the upstream development site.  Using the total cost function for a 100,000-cubic 
foot or larger retention pond given by Thurston et al. (2003), we calculate the marginal 
cost of abating an additional 10,000 cubic feet of runoff downstream as $3,800 (2010 
dollars).  This is a one-time construction cost for a retention pond that we expect will 
abate runoff years into the future.  If for example, the expected life of the pond is 35 
years, then we would have an annual cost of $3,800/35 years = $109 per 10,000 cubic 
feet (setting aside the discounting, for simplicity) to compare with our annual figure for 
marginal damage.  Discounting would reduce the annual marginal cost per 10,000 cubic 
feet estimate, depending on the choice of discount rate.  Discounting aside, in our 
example of installing a 100,000-cubic foot retention pond, we calculate the marginal 
abatement cost at $109 per 10,000 cubic feet of runoff abated.  Comparing this marginal 
cost to our marginal damage figure of $12,000 per 10,000 cubic feet provides a back-of-
the-envelope estimate for how the benefits of stormwater control compare with the costs.  
While this suggests that under current conditions, it would be economically efficient to 
abate additional stormwater runoff, we hasten to add that the above compares only the 
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construction cost associated with installation of the retention pond.  A more 
comprehensive cost comparison would reflect additional costs specifically faced by the 
Allen Creek community and should include the cost of land devoted to the retention 
pond, any effects of the pond or construction on surrounding property values, and any 
additional annual insurance, operating, and maintenance costs.  It is possible that an 
updated marginal abatement cost estimate may increase our cited figure so much that it 
becomes larger than our estimated marginal damage.  Depending upon the assumptions 
one might make about the curvature of the marginal abatement and marginal damage 
functions, the community under study may certainly find that it is welfare-enhancing to 
increase household-level stormwater abatement efforts.  To our best knowledge, there are 
no studies that provide marginal abatement cost estimates that consider the opportunity 
cost of land or provide cost functions to account for location-specific factors.  Thus, 
further research is warranted to refine these empirical estimates for a more meaningful 
comparison.  We mention this comparison to illustrate how our property damage 
estimation methodology can contribute to more complete assessments of the economic 
efficiency of stormwater abatement in particular communities.  
1.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to propose a multidisciplinary methodology for 
estimating marginal property damage from routine stormwater runoff events in small 
watersheds.  To pursue this goal, we combine economic and environmental science tools 
from the literature and extend those tools from the area-level to the individual parcel-
level of analysis.  Thus, our study makes two contributions.  First, while other studies 
have estimated property damage that arises from relatively infrequent floods such as 100-
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year events, we estimate property damage from exposure to regularly occurring 
stormwater quantity flows (average annual runoff).  Second, we believe our model is the 
first to take into account the parcel-level potential to both attenuate upstream stormwater 
flow and contribute to downstream stormwater flow.  Therefore, the estimates we obtain 
from our approach reflect each individual parcel’s runoff contribution and anticipated 
damages based on its location (upstream or downstream) relative to other properties.   
The key empirical take-away for the community under study is that marginal 
annual property damage from an additional 10,000 cubic feet of routine stormwater 
runoff is on the order of $12,000 (or $1.20 per one cubic foot).  Our comparison of this 
damage figure with a representative abatement cost figure based on the literature ($109 
per 10,000 cubic feet of runoff abated) suggests that expansion of decentralized BMPs 
such as upstream retention ponds in this small urbanized watershed is almost surely 
economically efficient.   
There are many additional directions for future research.  First, we focus on 
stormwater volume here and its impact upon assessed property values.  However, runoff 
generates changes in local water quality as well.  Hence, extensions of the model should 
take both quantity and quality into account.  Second, methodologies that allow for more 
complex analysis of surface hydrology could be used to generate a richer data set that 
includes homes located inside and outside the floodplain.  Third, our estimate of the 
damages based upon the first-stage hedonic regression analysis could be refined by 
collecting additional data that would permit a second-stage hedonic analysis (for instance, 
see Netusil, Chattopadhyay and Kovacs 2010).  
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Finally, our study based on hedonic regression estimation is intended to 
complement analyses based on estimated flood depth-damage curves.  FEMA routinely 
relies upon flood depth-damage curve analyses generated from its Hazus-MH software 
because of their simplicity and the availability of housing stock data.5  We are not aware 
of current FEMA flood depth-damage function estimates for the small urban watershed of 
our interest in this study.  We therefore anticipate seeing if such a function could be 
estimated for our watershed using FEMA’s Hazus-MH software and comparing the 
results.  Indeed, FEMA suggests that projections from its Hazus-MH flood module 
should not be considered comprehensive or used in place of local flood analyses to 
determine economic and financial decisions.  Rather, the Hazus-MH flood module is 
intended to provide additional support in informing policy.  Additionally, since the 
HAZUS-MH damage estimates rely on data aggregated at the census block level, results 
may be sensitive to aggregation bias and cannot incorporate variation in flood risk for 
buildings included in the analysis (FEMA 2017a).  In principle, we expect the results of 
the two analyses to be reasonably close.  However, the hedonic regression approach is 
designed to consider heterogeneity of flood risk at the household level and a wider 
variety of values at stake than a flood damage curve analysis is designed to capture.  
Specifically, the flood damage curve analysis focuses upon monetizing general physical 
damage to buildings and consequent repairs, whereas the hedonic regression approach 
attempts to capture values including those for the disruption or enhancement of local 
ecosystem services, aesthetics, and other non-market factors.
 
                                               
5 Pistrika, Tsakiris and Nalbantis (2014) provides an overview of depth-damage function methodology as 
practiced in several countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INFORMATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS: VALUING PUBLIC 
RISK PERCEPTION REGARDING THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL  
 
with Patrick Walsh, Landcare Research, Auckland, New Zealand 
2.1 Introduction 
The direct costs imposed by environmental disasters are undeniably large and can 
be devastating in both the short-term and long-term for local economies.  Contingent 
valuation studies on the largest marine oil spills in the US, the 1989 Exxon Valdez in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska and 2010 Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, 
estimate the costs of these events at $2.8 billion (1990) and $17.2 billion, respectively 
(Carson et al. 2003; Bishop et al. 2017).  Despite these staggering figures, the impact of 
these disasters may be undervalued if, in addition to actual physical damages, perceived 
risks are capitalized into markets.  Tanaka and Zabel (2017) show that public perceptions 
of risk are an important determinant of property values near nuclear power plants in US 
after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.  Other studies find that information 
on proximal or recent natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, negatively impact 
sale prices of residential properties that experience no direct environmental impacts, 
demonstrating that individual perceptions of unrealized risk drive realized economic 
losses in the real estate sector (Bin and Polasky 2004; Kousky 2010).  Additionally, 
media coverage and public announcements of nearby incidents can signal risk to markets, 
thereby impacting sale values (McCluskey and Rausser 2001; Hansen, Benson and Hagen 
2006).  These studies indicate that information regarding risk is critical in determining 
perceived risk levels, which are ultimately capitalized into market prices. Along these 
lines, this paper examines the impact of information regarding oil wash-ups from the 
 
32 
Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill and identifies a significant price reduction among 
coastal residential properties in Hillsborough County, Florida, even though no oil 
ultimately came ashore within 200 miles of the county. The timing of the observed price 
responses suggests that the authority of the source of information and the specific 
relevance of the risk-signal both play important roles in determining the extent to which 
risk surrounding environmental disasters is capitalized into markets. It is the 
capitalization of risk through perceptions of market participants which drives the often 
unrecognized, additional costs associated with environmental disasters.  
The uncertainty surrounding the geographic extent of shorelines that would suffer 
from oil wash-ups following the DWH oil spill provides a unique setting to analyze the 
impact of public perception of risk on home prices.  The goal of this paper is to quantify 
losses in the real estate market resulting from the perceived risk of oil damage to local 
shorelines in response to the flow of information regarding such risk.  In a related study, 
Hallstrom and Smith (2005) find that a “near miss” hurricane in Lee County, Florida 
provides updated information on risk of hurricane damage, resulting in a 19 percent drop 
in sale values of properties in a county that was ultimately not directly impacted by 
Hurricane Andrew.  Hallstrom and Smith (2005) characterize the lack of knowledge on 
the impact of the hurricane as risk and quantify the value of learning from the occurrence 
of disasters that happen in close geographic proximity.     
Unlike the single informational shock of being nearly missed by a specific 
hurricane, our analysis involves a more complex flow of information regarding the risk of 
amenity damage, in this case of oil wash-ups.  For Hillsborough County, the objective 
risk of oil wash-ups began with the explosion on the DWH on April 10, 2010, and a great 
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deal of information was released until the leak’s permanent containment on September 
19, 2010.  Between April and September, there existed significant uncertainty regarding 
the amount of oil that was leaking into the Gulf, where it might wash up, and which 
shorelines might be most affected.  We assess both the value of specific informational 
events and the broader period over which the total flow of public information contributed 
to meaningful reductions in coastal housing prices in Hillsborough County.  Our results 
suggest that the perceived risk of oil wash-ups drove down coastal residential property 
values by an average of 4% from July through December of 2010, of which the largest 
and most significant price drop of nearly 7% occurred during August through September.  
The timing of the largest price drops coincides with the release of two government 
reports that detailed the magnitude of the DWH leak and the areas likely to face oil wash-
ups.  The losses identified in this study are therefore consistent with price effects of 
changing risk perceptions driven by a risk signal that was both authoritative (i.e.- from a 
government source rather than a source with a commercial interest in minimizing the 
severity of the leak) and included specific information for Hillsborough County.  We also 
examine the impact on sale volumes, though our results suggest that coastal sale rates 
were unaffected.   
We use a quasi-experimental research design to quantify the costs imposed by 
shifts in public risk perceptions acting through real estate markets.  With sales data on 
single-family residences in Hillsborough County, Florida, we estimate both a hedonic 
model and analyze sale volumes using a difference-in-differences framework in both 
cases. This approach assesses the net effect of information regarding the DWH oil spill 
on the sales of properties that derive significant value from the amenity of coastal 
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proximity.  Since coastal proximity has an amenity value that would have been 
diminished by oil wash-ups, we identify our treatment group with a distance threshold, 
which captures properties that gain significant additional value from being near the 
shoreline. Our control group is non-coastal zone properties.  As would be expected, our 
estimates of the effects of perceived risk are smaller than the effects found by previous 
studies of the costs of realized oil wash-ups from the DWH.  In cross-sectional analyses 
of condominium sales along oiled beaches in Alabama, Siegal, Caudill and Mixon (2013) 
and Winkler and Gordon (2013) find reductions in sale values ranging from 5-13.5%.  
Winkler and Gordon also estimate a 40% decline in sale volumes from July to December 
2010. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to use panel data methods to estimate the 
damage imposed by perceived risk arising from the DWH oil spill and consider the value 
of different types of information in the context of an environmental disaster. Therefore, 
our results highlight both an additional avenue for economic losses from environmental 
catastrophes that has often been underappreciated and contribute to the literature through 
the assessment of a period of information flow over which risk perceptions are updated 
and the housing market responds accordingly.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on the 
DWH oil spill.  Section 3 describes our empirical approach, and Section 4 presents our 
main results.  In Section 5 we conclude the paper.  
2.2 Background 
On April 10, 2010, BP’s DWH oil rig exploded after a well blowout in the Gulf of 
Mexico, resulting in the unabated release of oil for 87 days before the leak was capped on 
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July 15, 2010.  Ultimately, the disaster resulted in the deaths of 11 workers, injury to 17 
others and oil wash-ups along 1,300 miles of shoreline in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama and Florida (Nixon et al. 2016).  As the largest oil spill in US history, there 
were many realized damages due to the spill, including physical and mental health 
impacts, economic losses to businesses and individuals, especially in the fishery and 
tourism industries, and the destruction of wildlife and natural habitats (Graham et al. 
2011).  Despite these immense losses, our study demonstrates additional losses imposed 
by the perception of risk surrounding oil wash-ups.  While the capping of the well in July 
stopped the oil flow, the well was not permanently shut until September 19, 2010.  
Therefore, between April and September, there existed considerable media coverage 
surrounding the events of the spill.  Much of the information reported included estimates 
of the flow rate from the leaking well and continually shifting and updated predictions of 
the movement of oil slicks and locations of likely wash-ups throughout this period.  
Between April and August, however, the reported flow rates estimates were being 
casually updated and were constantly in question. Additionally, until July, when the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provided specific 
probabilities of wash-ups by location, reports of projected oil movement were mostly 
vague and uncertain (Graham 2011). 
 Current studies report that shoreline wash-ups affected mostly beaches and coastal 
wetlands.  According to these assessments, 65% of oil wash-ups occurred in Louisiana, 
which was the first Gulf state to experience wash-ups in late April and includes most of 
the affected wetlands (BBC 2010; Nixon et al. 2016).  The heavier persistent oiling of 
beaches occurred in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, while beaches in the Florida 
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Panhandle experienced light persistent and transient oiling.  Beaches in Texas 
experienced only light oiling.  Persistent oiling is defined as oil that lasted for more than 
26 weeks as a result of lack of removal or the remobilizing and depositing of oil via 
tropical storms and other weather patterns (Nixon et al. 2016).    
While oil wash-ups began as early as the end of April for Louisiana, Florida saw 
its first oil wash-up in the form of tarballs along its northwestern coast in Pensacola on 
June 4 (Time Magazine 2010).  Therefore, immediately after the spill until early June, 
Florida residents may not have regarded wash-ups as directly relevant.  Throughout June, 
however, beaches in northwestern Florida continued to see wash-ups, and Escambia 
County issued a health advisory for some beaches due to oil sheening and tarballs on 
June 28 (Florida SERT 2017).  Tarballs form when wind and waves break up heavy oils 
that have become thick and sticky after mixing with water.  The oil gets torn into pieces 
that are typically the size of coins but can be as large as pancakes.  Tarballs are not easily 
broken down by the environment and can move across hundreds of miles.  These create 
an aesthetically unappealing beach scene, and NOAA advises against any contact as 
individuals may be sensitive or allergic to the chemicals contained in tarballs (NOAA 
2017).    
In early July, reports focused heavily on where the oil was going and how the 
upcoming hurricane season may impact the spill (Potter and Avram 2010).  After 
Hurricane Alex in early July, NOAA and other scientists predicted the remainder of the 
hurricane season would see above average activity, which would cause the oil to move, 
potentially resulting in more oil moving toward the coast.  Since the specific storm paths 
were unknown, however, it was also unclear which parts of the Gulf coast would be the 
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most affected (Biello 2010).1  The most concrete information on wash-up risk came from 
a report released by NOAA on July 2 indicating the probabilities of wash-ups for each 
location along the Gulf Coast.  This was the first official report to establish a non-zero 
probability (between 1-20%) of oil washing ashore along a stretch of Florida’s west 
coast, including Hillsborough County (NOAA 2010).  
On August 4, the federal government also released a report detailing what was 
deemed the “Oil Budget”. This report estimated the total discharge from the leak at 4.9 
million barrels.  In conjunction with this report, NOAA announced that only 50% of the 
oil had been removed via evaporation, burning, skimming or direct recovery, and it was 
unclear whether the remaining 50% still existed or was being degraded (Graham et al. 
2011).  The reports in early July and August injected detailed information from an 
unbiased source into the uncertain risk environment that had been previously 
characterized by speculation, damage minimization, and continual restatements of prior 
information.2  For a more detailed description of events surrounding the DWH oil spill 
see Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
                                               
1 The Atlantic hurricane season lasts from June through November each year, which coincides with the 
period of heightened risk of oil wash-ups due to the DWH in 2010.  While NOAA classifies the 2010 
Atlantic hurricane season as having “above normal” activity, Florida experienced no hurricanes during this 
season.  In fact, there were no hurricanes that impacted Florida between 2002-2014, except in 2004 and 
2005 (Bakkensen, Ding and Ma 2018).  Given no hurricanes in Florida occurred during our study period, 
from 2006-2014, suggests that market responses to the hurricane season are unlikely to confound any 
effects of risk regarding oil wash-ups in Hillsborough County.   
2 The fact that BP twice failed at capping the well is often attributed to their underestimation of the 
magnitude of the leak (Graham 2011). This provides further evidence of the uncertainty surrounding the 
magnitude of the DWH disaster in the early summer. 
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2.3. Empirical Approach  
Our study first uses a hedonic framework and then analyzes sale volumes, both within a 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach, to estimate costs associated with the risk of 
damages presented by the DWH oil spill through coastal real estate markets.  The 
objective risk of oil wash-ups in Gulf states increased when the DWH explosion occurred 
on April 20, 2010; however, this risk was the largest for states located closer to well site, 
like Louisiana, which is located nearly 50 miles from the explosion site.  Of all the Gulf 
states, Florida is located furthest from the site of the DWH explosion.  The first oil wash-
ups along Florida beaches began in June and extended only as far as Panama City, but no 
wash-ups occurred beyond northwestern Florida in the months following the explosion 
(Graham 2011).  Despite the lack of wash-ups in other Florida counties, residents in these 
counties received a continuous flow of information regarding the risk of wash-ups in the 
months following the explosion.  In this study, we explore how the provision of 
information signaling objective risk impacted real estate prices and volumes through 
changes in public risk perceptions.  Since the aim of this paper is to measure the value of 
losses associated with the risk of damages from the DWH oil spill, rather than actual 
physical damages, we use sales data from Hillsborough County, a southwestern county in 
Florida that did not ultimately have any oil wash-ups. 
The value of nearby amenities, such as coastal proximity, is often capitalized into 
home prices (Bin and Kruse 2006).  As Hillsborough County is located on the Gulf coast, 
coastal proximity is an important amenity, and we expect its value would be reduced by 
oil wash-ups via health risks, diminished recreation and aesthetics.  Therefore, we focus 
on the potential degradation of the coastal amenity as the channel through which the risk 
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of oil wash-ups would be capitalized and define coastal properties as our treated group 
and non-coastal properties as our control group.  We quantitatively determine our coastal 
group based on the empirically diminishing amenity value of being located near the 
waterfront.  In a traditional DID, the treatment period is defined by the time after an 
event; however, in our study, the event of interest is the discrete period over which 
information regarding the risk of oil wash-up was pertinent to Gulf residents.  Therefore, 
we define the treatment period as the number of months (determined below) after the 
DWH oil spill during which negative price effects persisted to some degree in the coastal 
real estate market. We use a discrete – rather than open-ended – treatment period because 
the relevant risk diminished after the spill had been sufficiently contained for several 
months without any oil wash-ups.  
 Given the amenity value of the coast, we expect that coastal homes are 
compositionally different from those located inland (see Table 2.1).  Identification from a 
sample of coastal and non-coastal residential property sales that occurred only during our 
period of interest would therefore be confounded by the unobservable differences in the 
groups. Inferences drawn from a sample which included only coastal residential property 
sales could be confounded by shocks or trends that may exist independently of the event 
of interest. Using the DID approach, we control for any trends or shocks that are common 
in both the treated and control groups while also addressing compositional differences 
between the groups. This panel-based approach, therefore, enables us to draw more 
appropriate causal inferences about the effect of information regarding the DWH oil spill 
on coastal residential sale prices and volumes than either a cross-sectional or event study. 
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2.3.1 Data 
Our hedonic model relies on data detailing structural, neighborhood and parcel 
characteristics for homes sold in Hillsborough County, Florida. Hillsborough County is 
located on the Gulf Coast in southwestern Florida.  The closest county to Hillsborough 
with oil wash-ups in 2010 was a distance of roughly 200 miles away as shown in Figure 
2.1.   
Figure 2.1:  Hillsborough County and relative location of oiled counties in Florida. 
 
Notes: The dark gray shaded area shows the location of Hillsborough County in the state of Florida while 
the black shaded areas represent Florida counties that experienced oil wash-ups in 2010 as a result of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  The closest county to Hillsborough with oil wash-ups in 2010 was a 
Euclidean distance of roughly 200 miles away.  
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These data were obtained from the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser and include 
sales occurring between the years 1901-2015.  Our examination focuses on observations 
of sales of single-family residences that occurred in 2006 through 2014. Since the sale 
prices of transactions that occur between non-independent parties (e.g. related to one 
another) do not represent true market value, we keep only sales indicated as arms-length.  
We also drop duplicate observations and outliers that could bias our results including 
homes sized less than 500 square-feet, homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, sales 
below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price, and observations with missing 
information for variables included in our analyses.  The sample used in our main analysis 
includes 112,312 transactions of 92,661 unique properties.  All prices are standardized to 
2014 dollars using the US Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) quarterly price 
indices for the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan (FHFA 2017).  Table 2.1 provides 
summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis for our main sample and 
separately for the treatment and control groups.  Similarly, Table 2.2 provides summary 
statistics of variables separately for our broadly defined treatment period compared with 
the control period. 
2.3.2 Identification of Treatment and Controls 
We start by using regression analysis to define our treatment group.  Since we are 
interested in the effect of risk regarding the DWH oil spill on the coastal real estate 
market, a natural control is the non-coastal real estate market.  However, since the value 
of the coast likely extends beyond simply waterfront properties, we seek to define a zone 
in which proximity to the coast serves as a valuable amenity that is observably capitalized 
into home values.  
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for full sample, treatment Group (coastal zone) and control 
group (non-coastal zone). 
Variable 
Description 
Full Sample   Coastal Zone  Non-Coastal Zone 
Mean SD   Mean      SD  Mean SD  
Transaction 
price in 
2014$ 
195,029 194,181   252,443 112,117  187,933 89,191  
Transaction 
year 
2010 3   2010 3  2010 3  
Transaction 
month 
7 3   7 3  7 3  
Age at time 
of sale  
21 21   32 27  20 20  
Number of 
bathrooms  
 
2.24 0.65   2.15 0.67  2.26 0.64  
Interior 
living area 
(sqft) 
 
1,861 660   1,766 574  1,872 669  
Parcel 
acreage 
0.26 0.47   0.17 0.20  0.27 0.49  
=1 if pool 
present, 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41   0.17 0.37  0.22 0.41  
Dist. to 
nearest 
urban cluster 
(km) 
18.57 9.61   14.93 8.09  19.02 9.69  
Dist. to 
primary road 
(km) 
4.92 3.80   4.92 2.33  4.92 3.94  
=1 if home 
on 
waterfront, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.03 0.18   0.10 0.30  0.02 0.15  
Dist. to the 
coast (m) 
10,134 7,263   1,047 521  11,275 6,912  
Observations 112,312    12,354   99,958   
Notes: The full sample includes arms-length transactions of single-family residences in Hillsborough 
County from 2006 through 2014 for which information on all variables included in the analyses is 
available.  This sample also removes duplicate observations, homes sized less than 500 square-feet,  
homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, and sales below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price.  
Sale prices are in 2014 constant dollars. The treatment group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of 
residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and control group (non-coastal zone) 
includes the remaining inland sales.   
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for full sample, broadly-defined treated period (July 
through December 2010) and control period. 
Variable 
Description 
Full Sample   July-Dec 2010  Non-Treated 
Period 
Mean SD   Mean      SD  Mean SD  
Transaction 
price in 
2014$ 
195,029 194,181   207,908 103,134  194,505 93,761  
Transaction 
year 
2010 3   2010 0  2010 3  
Transaction 
month 
7 3   10 2  6 3  
Age at time 
of sale  
21 21   19 20  21 22  
Number of 
bathrooms  
 
2.24 0.65   2.30 0.64  2.24 0.65  
Interior 
living area 
(sqft) 
 
1,861 660   1,928 664  1,858 660  
Parcel 
acreage 
0.26 0.47   0.26 0.40  0.26 0.47  
=1 if pool 
present, 0 
otherwise 
0.21 0.41   0.23 0.42  0.21 0.41  
Dist. to 
nearest 
urban cluster 
(km) 
18.57 9.61   19.36 9.71  18.54 9.60  
Dist. to 
primary road 
(km) 
4.92 3.80   5.05 3.85  4.91 3.79  
=1 if home 
on 
waterfront, 0 
otherwise 
 
0.03 0.18   0.03 0.18  0.03 0.18  
Dist. to the 
coast (m) 
10,134 7,263   10,470 7,393  10,120 7,257  
Observations 112,312    4,390   107,922   
Notes: The full sample includes arms-length transactions of single-family residences in Hillsborough 
County from 2006 through 2014 for which information on all variables included in the analyses is 
available.  This sample also removes duplicate observations, homes sized less than 500 square-feet, 
homes with lots sizes less than 0.01 acres, and sales below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in price.  
Sale prices are in 2014 constant dollars. The treatment period is defined as sales of residential properties 
occurring from July through December 2010 and the control period includes the remaining sales.  
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To this end, we regress the natural log of home prices on various structural and 
neighborhood characteristics and allow prices to vary flexibly with distance from the 
coast. We specify the following model: 
 ln ]?^@ = 	_`abc +	∑ (ef.?f)MgfhM +ibj + k^ +	S?^@                                               (2.1) 
 
In Equation (2.1)  ln ]?^@ 	 is the natural log of transaction price for home i located in 
neighborhood j at time t.  xijt  is a vector of home, parcel and neighborhood 
characteristics, while ib includes year and month-of-year fixed effects and k^  is a 
neighborhood fixed effect at the Census tract group level.  The variable .?f includes 
dummies representing ten bands of distance from the coast, where d=1 corresponds to 
homes located 0 to 500 meters from coast, d=2 indicates homes located 500 meters to 
1,000 meters from the coast, and so on until d=10, which indicates homes located 4,500 
meters to 5000 meters from the coast. εijt is a random disturbance term assumed to be 
distributed normally with a zero mean.   
The results of this regression are presented in Table 2.3  The coefficients on the 
coastal band dummies are positive and highly statistically significant up to 2,000 meters 
from the coast and lose significance thereafter. This pattern suggests the price premium 
associated with the coastal amenity disappears after 2,000 meters (about 1 mile) from the 
coast.  This result is further supplemented by Figure 2.2, which shows the residuals from 
a regression of the natural log of detrended prices on observables against the distance 
from the coast.  Figure 2.2 clearly demonstrates that residual prices begin to climb in 
relation to coastal proximity beginning around 2,000 meters from the coast.  
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Table 2.3:  Regression results for identification of treatment group. 
 Impact on ln(Price) 
Located 0-500 meters from the coast  0.3309*** 
 (0.0638) 
Located 500-1,000 meters from the coast 0.2546*** 
 (0.0558) 
Located 1,000-1,500 meters from the coast 0.1877*** 
 (0.0574) 
Located 1,500-2,000 meters from the coast 0.1213** 
 (0.0484) 
Located 2,000-2,500 meters from the coast 0.0132 
 (0.0455) 
Located 2,500-3,000 meters from the coast 0.0205 
 (0.0429) 
Located 3,000-3,500 meters from the coast 0.0012 
 (0.0398) 
Located 3,500-4,000 meters from the coast -0.0052 
 (0.0347) 
Located 4,000-4,500 meters from the coast -0.0297 
 (0.0331) 
Located 4,500-5,000 meters from the coast -0.0074 
 (0.0270) 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y 
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 112,312 
Adj. R2 0.7842 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *- significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( )  
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars.  Additional 
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the 
total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the  
parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in 
kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on 
the waterfront, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. 
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Figure 2.2: Distance decay of premium for coastal amenity in Hillsborough County. 
 
Notes:  The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on the age of the home at the time of sale, 
a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, 
the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban 
cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the 
waterfront, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects.  The plot displays a local polynomial 
regression of the residuals against the home’s distance from the coast in meters with smoothing at degree 1 
and a bandwidth of 750. 
 
 
These results suggest that the amenity value of the coast is not restricted to waterfront 
properties (though the estimates do suggest nearly an 18% price premium for waterfront 
properties, and therefore, we do control for being located on the waterfront in other 
analyses). Therefore, we define our treatment group, coastal zone homes, as those located 
up to 2,000 meters from the coast and our control as the homes located beyond 2,000 
meters in Hillsborough County. 
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Using this definition of the coastal zone, we first confirm the existence of some 
response to information regarding the DWH oil spill on home prices in Hillsborough 
County and then seek to identify a treatment period over which the effects of oil wash-up 
risks led to reduced real estate values. Expanding on the approach to identifying a coastal 
zone and again controlling for seasonality, time trends, and property and neighborhood 
characteristics, we regress an interaction of 12 monthly dummies over the period from 
February 2010 to January 2011 with an indicator for whether the home is coastal or non-
coastal.  To identify the timing and types of information that may have been important for 
the capitalization of risk into market prices, we estimate the following DID model: 
 ln ]?^@ = 	_`abc + 	e.? + ∑ (Vl*@l + mln.? ∗ *@lp)MRlhM +ibj + k^ +	S?^@             (2.2) 
 
Equation (2.2) is similar to Equation (2.1) but includes only one coastal dummy, .?, and 
adds the variable, *?l, and the interaction of these two terms.  .? equals one if the home 
is located within the coastal zone, and *?l are indicators for each of the twelve months 
from February 2010 through January 2011, where p=1 corresponds to homes that sold 
anytime during the month of February 2010, p=2 indicates homes that sold anytime 
during the month of March 2010, and so on until p=12, which indicates a transaction 
anytime during the month of January 2011.  The time period considered by this analysis 
was selected to provide time before and after the leak was active so that the full temporal 
extent of the effects can be characterized. The interaction terms allow us to identify 
impacts in the months following the spill in order to define broader treatment periods.   
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The coefficients of interest, the interaction of coastal zone sales with each 
monthly indicator, are plotted in Figure 2.3 (Table A.2 in Appendix A presents the values 
of the interaction terms).   
 
Figure 2.3: Price effects by month.  
 
Notes:  The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on the age of the home at the time of sale, 
a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, 
the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban 
cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the 
waterfront, an indicator for coastal zone, monthly indicators for each month shown above, the interaction of 
the coastal zone and monthly indicators (plotted above) and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed 
effects. The coastal zone is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the 
coast and non-coastal zone includes the remaining inland sales.  The plot displays the coefficients and 90% 
confidence intervals associated with the interaction of monthly dummies with the coastal zone indicator 
from this regression.   
 
 
The only coefficients that are statistically significant at conventional levels are the 
months of August and September 2010; however, the negative signs on coefficients in the 
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months of July through December are suggestive of a broader treatment period.  We 
conclude from this analysis that coastal zone homes sold for less in August and 
September 2010 due to the DWH oil spill but may have sold for less from July through 
December 2010 and run two specifications: one defining the treatment period as August 
through September 2010 and a second that defines the treatment period as July through 
December 2010. The first seeks to capture the acute effect of information highlighting an 
environmental risk while the second specification captures the entire effect of uncertainty 
regarding the local effects of the DWH disaster. 
With our treatment and control groups and periods defined, we assess the validity 
of our control by graphing the price paths for the coastal and non-coastal groups during 
the period of our study between 2006 and 2014.  Figure 2.4 shows that while the trends 
outside our defined treatment period are not perfectly matched, they generally follow 
similar trends, especially leading into the treatment period when divergence in trends is 
most likely to undermine the parallel-trends assumption at the heart of DID identification. 
Our main treatment effect is also clearly visible in Figure 2.4 as coastal zone prices begin 
to slope downward in the treatment period, while non-coastal zone prices remain upward 
sloping.   
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Figure 2.4: Sale price paths for coastal zone and non-coastal zone residential properties 
from 2006 through 2014 in Hillsborough County. 
 
Notes:  The natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars is regressed on an indicator for coastal zone 
properties.  The treated group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 
2,000 meters from the coast and control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.  The plot 
displays a cubic spline function with 15 bands specified.  The broad treatment period, from July through 
December 2010, is contained by the two vertical lines.  The periods before July 2010 and after December 
2010 represent the untreated time period.   
 
2.3.3 Main Specification 
Using our identified treatment group and periods, we specify the following DID 
model to estimate the impact of information associated with the DWH oil spill on coastal 
properties in Hillsborough County: 
 ln ]?^@ = 	_`abc + 	e.? + qrkr,s@ + m{rkr,s@ × .?} + ibj + k^ +	S?^@               (2.3) 
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Equation (2.3), the specification for our main results, is identical to Equation (2.2) except 
instead of the series of monthly indicators, we include the single indicator variable, rkr,s@ which is equal to one if the transaction took place during our identified treatment 
period.  The coefficient of interest attached to the interaction between the treatment group 
and period, m, represents the average treatment effect on the treated group.  As the 
dependent variable in Equation (2.3) is logged, coefficient estimates are interpreted as the 
percent change in housing prices associated with the treatment effect.  
 In addition to the analysis of sales prices described above, we also estimate the 
impact of the spill on weekly sales volumes, as homeowners may have been less likely to 
negotiate coastal property sales until the uncertainty resolved. This represents another 
channel, alongside price impacts, through which the spill could have welfare impacts. 
Even in the absence of  price effects, reduced sales volumes could still indicate costly 
impacts of increased levels of perceived risk.  This may be the case if homeowners were 
unable to sell their homes at the optimal time due to lack of interested buyers or if 
prospective buyers were unable to purchase a home due to low availability of homes on 
the market.  To investigate whether and to what extent the DWH may have impacted 
sales volumes in Hillsborough County, we regress the number of weekly sales by Census 
tract on a dummy indicator for location in our defined coastal zone, a dummy for our 
identified time period, the interaction between our treated group and time period, and 
month-of-year and year fixed effects.  We define the coastal zone as those tracts that 
include at least 85% of properties within 2,000 meters of the coast.   
Since the dependent variable is the number of weekly sales by Census tract, 
observations are counts, or nonnegative integer values.  In the case of count data, the 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is not appropriate as it generates both positive 
and negative predicted values. Additionally, natural log transformations have limited use 
when the dependent variable contains many zero observations as is the case in our 
dependent variable.  Therefore, we analyze sale volumes using the Poisson and negative 
binomial count data models (Wooldridge 2002).  We begin by using the maximum 
likelihood estimator to estimate the Poisson model given by: 
 
w(x|_) = rLz(_)z(_){x! ,							x = 0,1,…																																																																										(2.4)		 
 
In Equation (2.4), y is the number of weekly sales by Census tract, and x is a vector of 
independent variables including an indicator for the coastal group, an indicator for the 
treated time period, an interaction term for the coastal group and treated time period, and 
month-of-year and year fixed effects.  Y() ≡ Å(x|_) = r_Ç is the conditional mean, 
which is assumed equal to the conditional variance, Var(y|x).    
 When the variance-mean equality assumption is violated, the data display 
overdispersion, which is accounted for in a generalization of the Poisson model, the 
negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi 1986).  Using the maximum likelihood 
estimator, we also estimate this model below: 
 
w(x|_) = Γ Jx + 1PKΓ(x + 1)Γ J1PK(PY(_))Ñ[1 + PY(_)]L(ÑáM à⁄ ),							x = 0,1,…														 (2.5) 
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The variables in Equation (2.5) are the same as previously defined in Equation (2.4) with 
the addition of the nuisance parameter to be estimated, P > 0.  The conditional mean is Y() ≡ Å(x|_) = r_Ç, and the conditional variance is >ãå(x|_) = Y(1 + PY), such that 
the variance is greater than the mean. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 2.4 presents the coefficients of interest from our main specification for 
analyzing price impacts in Equation (2.3).  Each column in Table 2.4 represents a 
separate regression. The second column reports the coefficient on the interaction term 
when the treatment period is defined as August through September 2010, and the third 
column reports the coefficient on the interaction term when the treatment period is 
defined as July through December 2010. In both regressions, this coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
These results suggest that the net impact of information regarding the risk of oil 
wash-ups on coastal zone homes was nearly a 4% reduction in sale prices between two 
and eight months after the DWH oil spill, with the largest impact of 7% reduction in 
prices occurring in August and September 2010.  We also note that the signs on the 
coefficients associated with the control variables in both regressions are consistent with 
expectations.    
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Table 2.4:  Main results: Price impacts associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
during periods when perceived risk was capitalized into home values. 
 
Coastal zone sale 
August 
 through September 
2010 
Coastal zone sale July 
through December 2010 
Impact on ln (Price) -0.0672*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0141) 
Tract Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Month-of-Year Fixed 
Effects Y Y 
Observations 112,312 112,312 
Adj. R2 0.7830 0.7830 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( ) 
Notes: The columns represent two separate regressions with different definitions of the treated period.  In 
both regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars, and additional 
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of 
bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the 
presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest 
primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, an indicator for the treated period,  
an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. The treated group 
(coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and 
control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.   
 
Because the observed date in the sales data is the date of closing and not the 
beginning of the sale contract, we expect some lag in price responses. Since the average 
time between the beginning of a contract and closing of a sale is four to six weeks, the 
price impacts in July through December 2010 can most reasonably be attributed to events 
that occurred in late May through early November (Zillow 2017).  Though oil begin 
washing up in Louisiana as soon as one week after the DWH explosion, it was not until 
May 19 that oil had entered the Loop Current in the Gulf, and it was announced that oil 
could move towards Florida (BBC 2010).   Shortly after, in the beginning of June, oil 
began to wash-up along the coast of the Florida Panhandle, and health advisories were 
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issued for some beaches in Escambia County at the end of June (Florida SERT 2017).  
According to the results from the broader treatment period definition, the public 
perception of this local risk was not enough to be capitalized into the Hillsborough 
County real estate market until oil wash-ups actually occurred in Florida, suggesting the 
relevance of risk-signaling information is an important dimension for capitalization of 
risk into home prices.     
In addition to relevance, authoritative sources of risk information also appear to 
drive market impacts in our study, which is demonstrated by the largest and most 
significant price impacts occurring in August and September 2010.  Accounting for time 
between the contract date and closing date, this price effect aligns with information 
released in early July through August, which corresponds to the release of the two major 
government reports that quantified wash-up risks. In the July report an official source 
explicitly assigned a non-zero risk of oil wash-ups to Hillsborough County.  The August 
report provided a specific value for the amount of oil that had been released, which was 
much larger than prior estimates, and also provided estimates of the volume of extant oil 
extant in Gulf that still threatened shorelines.  Both reports came from an authoritative 
source, which suggests that trust may play an influential role in shaping perceived risks 
consistent with Botzen, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan’s (2015) findings on flood-related 
risk perceptions.   While the first report included information directly relevant to 
Hillsborough County, information contained in the second report likely increased the 
mean subjective risk level of oil wash-ups in all coastal areas considered to have non-zero 
risk.  Throughout May and June, information regarding the amount of oil leaking and its 
movement in the Gulf was continually updated and presented casually across the media 
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but did not result in impacts in the Hillsborough County real estate market.  In contrast, 
the authoritative presentation of information contained in the July and August reports 
corresponds to the significant reductions in coastal home values in Hillsborough County 
in August and September.   
Over a broader period, sale price reductions follow the first oil wash-ups in 
Florida and diminish only after the permanent containment of the leak and the remaining 
volumes of spilled oil were likely not perceived to pose significant wash-up risk. As 
presented in Figure 2.3, our results suggest price effects from July through December 
with significant drops in magnitude following the definitive shut down of the oil well in 
mid-September.  These price responses are in accordance with the real estate market 
responding to perceived risk of oil wash-ups given that the effects follow the earliest oil 
wash-ups in Florida, strongly persist throughout the months when an authoritative source 
released information demonstrating clear risk and dissipate shortly after the shutting 
down of the well.  
In a demonstration of the validity of our identification strategy, we conduct a 
placebo test in which the treatment periods are coded to be one year before or one year 
after the time of the actual treatment periods considered in our analysis. As presented in 
Table 2.5, none of the estimated price effects are significant during the placebo periods, 
suggesting our estimation strategy effectively identifies non-cyclical variation unique to 
the coastal properties during the period when risk of oil wash-ups from the DWH leak 
was the greatest. 
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Table 2.5:  Placebo test: Price impacts in the year of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
compared to the years before and after. 
 
Coastal zone sale August 
through September 
Coastal zone sale July 
through December  
Treated year = 2009 -0.0248 0.0090 
 (0.0215) (0.0172) 
Treated year = 2010 -0.0672*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0141) 
Treated year = 2011 -0.0220 0.0066 
 (0.0171) (0.0155) 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( ) 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression.  The columns represent different definitions of the treated 
period while the rows indicate a different treated year.  Our main results use treated periods in 2010.  In all 
regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars, and additional controls 
include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the total number of 
bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel size, an indicator for the 
presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the distance to the nearest 
primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, and indicator for the treated period, 
an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. The treated group 
(coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters from the coast and 
control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.   
 
In Table 2.6, we also demonstrate that our effects are robust to changes in the definition 
of our main sample, specifically the inclusion of all sales, irrespective of selling price, 
and the inclusion a wider set of residential properties (single-family, townhomes, condos 
and mobile homes).    
Finally, in Table 2.7 we present the results from our sales volume analysis.  Table 
2.7 reports the marginal effects for the Poisson and negative binomial models, which give 
the discrete change in weekly sale counts by Census tract between non-coastal zone and 
coastal zone sales evaluated at the mean number of sales.  Though the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction between the coastal zone and defined time periods are 
statistically insignificant and of similar magnitude in both models, the nuisance  
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Table 2.6: Robustness check: Price impacts using differently defined samples of sale 
prices. 
 
Coastal zone sale 
August through 
September 2010 
Coastal zone sale 
July through 
December 2010 
Main Sample -0.0672*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0141) 
Single-family residences, all 
prices -0.0589*** -0.0330** 
 (0.0223) (0.0157) 
All residence types, price 
restrictions -0.0600*** -0.0268* 
 (0.02188) (0.0162) 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( ) 
Notes: The rows represent regressions using different samples while columns represent regressions with 
different definitions of the treated period for each sample.  The first row represents the main sample which 
includes only sales of single-family residences and those within the 5th and 95th percentiles in price 
(n=112,312).  The second row’s sample includes only sales of single-family residences but does not 
exclude any sales based on price (n=124,827).  The third row excludes sales below the 5th and above the 
95th percentiles in price but includes all residence types, single-family, townhomes, condos, and mobile 
homes (n=153,972).  In all regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 
dollars, and additional controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of 
sale, the total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the parcel 
size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in kilometers, the 
distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on the waterfront, an indicator 
for the treated period, an indicator for coastal zone, and Census tract, year and month-of-year fixed effects. 
The treated group (coastal zone) is defined as sales of residential properties located within 2,000 meters 
from the coast and control (non-coastal zone) includes the remaining inland sales.   
 
 
parameter, P, from Equation (2.5) is statistically significant, indicating overdispersion 
and lending support for the negative binomial model over the Poisson.  These results 
suggest that oil wash-up risk impacted sale prices in Hillsborough County, but not 
average sales volumes.  Together with the lack of clear evidence for compositional shifts 
in the properties transacted during the treated period (see Table 2.2), these results suggest 
that reduced transaction prices were the main market response to the increased levels of 
perceived risk during the period following the DWH explosion.  
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Table 2.7: Impacts on weekly sale volumes by census tract (marginal effects). 
 
Coastal zone sale 
August through 
September 2010 
Coastal zone sale July 
through December 2010 
Poisson  -0.0438 0.0130 
 (0.0614) (0.0443) 
Negative Binomial  -0.0504 0.0049 
 (0.0611) (0.0442) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Observations 143,208 143,208 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *-significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( ) 
Notes: : Each cell displays the marginal effect at the mean associated with the interaction between the 
coastal zone and treated period for a different regression.  The marginal effect is the expected difference in 
the number of weekly sales within a Census tract between coastal and inland property sales. The columns 
represent different definitions of the treated period while the rows use a different estimation method: 
Poisson, and negative binomial.  The dependent variable is the number of weekly sales by Census tract, and 
additional controls include an indicator for coastal zone, an indicator for treated time period and year and 
month-of-year fixed effects. A Census tract is defined as being in the treated group (coastal zone) if it 
contains at least 85% of properties located within 2,000 meters of the coast. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
While many losses attributable to environmental disasters are evident through the 
destruction of property or loss of life, the risk of such damage imposes less obvious 
economic losses through social perceptions. This paper seeks to causally identify the 
losses imposed by the perceived risk of oil wash-up from the DWH oil spill on coastal 
real-estate markets and the types of information that drive these losses and therefore are 
important for informing perceived risk levels.  We investigate damages resulting from 
informational signals of risk regarding the DWH oil spill to homeowners in Hillsborough 
County, Florida.  While oil wash-ups occurred along much of the Gulf Coast shoreline, 
no oil reached the beaches in Hillsborough County; yet our results suggest that coastal 
sale prices were nonetheless reduced due to the oil spill. Using a difference-in-differences 
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specification within a hedonic framework, we find suggestive evidence of price impacts 
between July and December 2010, with the largest effects observed for sales that closed 
in August and September.  These impacts correspond to the information types that 
contain relevant and authoritatively sourced assessments of risk to Hillsborough County, 
suggesting the importance of these dimensions of information in shaping public 
perceptions of risk.   
A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on our findings of a 4% decline in 
prices multiplied by the average sale price for coastal residences in the untreated period 
($252,181) and the number of coastal homes sold between July and December 2010 (447) 
results in nearly $4.5 million worth of real estate losses in Hillsborough County due to 
the perceived risks associated with the DWH oil spill.  Putting this figure in perspective, 
as part of a lawsuit filed by the US Department of Justice, Florida was awarded $3.25 
billion to cover damages incurred as a result of the DWH oil spill, of which $28.5 million 
was allocated to Hillsborough County to compensate losses mainly in tourism revenues 
(Contorno 2015).  According to this figure, of the $28.5 million paid to Hillsborough 
County, nearly 16% of this is accounts for losses experienced by sellers of coastal real 
estate in the county during the second half of 2010.  These demonstrated losses suggest 
that policymakers must consider a more comprehensive definition of damages, 
specifically accounting for losses associated with public perception of risks, when 
compensating state and local governments for losses due to environmental disasters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
IDENTIFYING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF INFORMATION ON POLLUTION 
LEVELS IN CHILE  
 
with Jamie Mullins, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
Air pollution is still a significant problem in many parts of the world.  While it 
can be difficult to effectively regulate sources of pollution emissions, developing 
countries in particular are burdened by the tradeoff between economic growth and air 
quality concerns.  Chile, however, is one country that appears to have achieved a balance.  
Over the past two decades, Chile has significantly reduced air pollution concentrations in 
its most populous and economically important city, Santiago.  It has also recently joined 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2010, 
signifying its shift in status from a developing to developed nation.  Chile has come a 
long way in the last three decades. Santiago, in particular was long known for its 
extremely poor air quality.  As a result, the government of Chile began a concerted effort 
to address air pollution in the late 1980s through late 1990s, eventually implementing the 
Plan de Prevención y Descontaminación Atmosférica (translated as the Plan to Prevent 
and Reduce Air Pollution (PPDA)) in the Santiago Metropolitan Region in 1997.   
The PPDA includes multiple provisions aimed at reducing air pollution, but 
central to this policy is the monitoring and announcement of days for which air pollution 
concentrations are projected to exceed threshold levels.  Days expected to have 
particularly poor air quality are deemed “Episodes”.  The day prior to an Episode, the 
public is notified, and on the day of an Episode, a number of restrictions on various 
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emissions activities go in effect.  The PPDA has been an important policy intervention 
for Santiago.  Before going into effect, it was not uncommon for levels of particulate 
matter (PM10) in Santiago to exceed the World Health Organization (WHO)’s 24-hour 
mean guideline for PM10 by 500% or more (WHO 2011).1   
Troncoso, de Grange and Cifuentes (2012) and Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) 
both find that Episode announcements (as part of the PPDA) effectively reduce air 
pollution levels in the short-run.  Troncoso, de Grange and Cifuentes (2012) study 
suggests that Episodes lead to significant reductions in particulate matter, CO, NOx, and 
O3 during an Episode.  Focusing specifically on PM10, Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) 
demonstrate that Episodes work on two crucial dimensions: Episodes reduce both PM10 
concentrations and mortality on the day of and in the days following an announcement.  
That improvements in air quality and mortality occur simultaneously is consistent with 
studies that establish a link between short-term exposure to high levels of air pollution 
and a broad range of negative human health outcomes (Currie et al. 2009; Neidell 2009; 
Graff Zivin and Neidell 2012; Schlenker and Walker 2016).   
Aside from the impact of exposure on health, however, short-term spikes in 
pollution may also be costly if individuals undertake behavioral changes to avoid such 
exposure (Graff Zivin and Neidell 2013).  A number of studies demonstrate that 
individuals change their behavior in response to publicly disclosed information regarding 
environmental conditions to avoid or reduce exposure (Shimshack, Ward and Beatty 
2007; Graff Zivin, Neidell and Schlenker 2011).  For instance, Neidell (2009) finds that 
attendance at outdoor facilities falls in Southern California as a result of “smog alerts”.  
                                               
1 The WHO guideline for daily mean PM10 is 50 µg/m3.   
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Similarly, Cutter and Neidell (2009) show that public advisories on high ozone levels in 
the San Francisco Bay area reduce traffic volumes and increase use of public 
transportation.  These papers highlight the importance of the role of information and 
suggest that information can play in integral role in policy design and implementation.  
And while there are several studies that assess the effectiveness of short-term policy 
measures set by local governments to limit pollution exposure, few disentangle the health 
and information channels of the effects they identify by controlling for avoidance 
behavior (Neidell 2009; Moretti and Neidell 2011).   
Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find significant reductions in mortality as a result 
of the Chilean Episode announcements; however, these identified health effects represent 
both the biological effect associated with reduced PM10 concentrations and any 
behavioral effects that reduce individuals’ exposure to PM10 by avoiding outdoor 
activities and/or reducing exposure via other costly means (e.g. the employment of 
filtration systems).  Considering the effectiveness of Episodes, it is important to 
understand the mechanisms through which Episodes appear to reduce mortality rates in 
the Santiago Metropolitan Region.  Since Episodes both reduce PM10 levels and involve 
information dissemination, mortality reductions could be a result of biological responses 
to ambient pollution concentrations, behavioral changes, or both.  To provide insight on 
the channels through which Episodes improve health outcomes, in this paper we 
decompose the total effect of Episodes given by Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) to isolate 
any behavioral effect of information from the biological effect of reduced PM10. 
To do this, we decompose Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results through the 
use of an alternative control group which allows for the separate identification of the 
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purely information-driven mortality reducing effects of Episode announcements. Mullins 
and Bharadwaj (2014) identify the mortality effects of Episodes by matching days on 
which Episode announcements occur with similar days based on conditions preceding the 
matched day. Pollution and mortality outcomes are then compared following the Episode 
and matched days (when no Episode was announced) to identify the effects of the 
Episode announcement.  We similarly use propensity score matching and a difference-in-
difference approach to first replicate Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results, estimating 
the full impact of Episode announcements on mortality.  To estimate the behavioral 
effects of Episodes, we then use propensity score matching based on conditions both 
before and after Episode announcements to match periods with similar pollution patterns 
in which no Episode was announced.  In both cases, matches are drawn from the period 
before the full implementation of the PPDA when Episodes where not yet in full use.  
Because the pollution conditions are by construction similar between Episode periods and 
matched periods, differences in health outcomes following an Episode (versus matched 
non-Episode periods) can be attributed directly to the informational content of the 
Episode announcement and the resulting avoidance behaviors undertaken by the 
population in response to the provided information.  
We find that, holding PM10 constant, Episode announcements result in a 
significant reduction in deaths, particularly for respiratory deaths among the general 
population and the elderly.  Our results are consistent with other studies finding that 
individuals do limit their exposure to air pollution after the provision of information on 
air quality.  These results also provide evidence that information is an essential 
component of the PPDA in affecting health outcomes.  In addition, the estimated impacts 
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of the Episodes’ informational effects have magnitudes comparable to the estimated total 
effects of Episode announcements on the day of and two days after an Episode 
announcement, suggesting that information is playing a critical role in the reduction of 
mortality following Episode announcements. Our results suggest that little of the 
observed reduction in mortality following Episodes is attributable to lower ambient air 
pollution in the most immediate days following an announcement, despite the fact that air 
pollution does improve significantly following Episode announcements.   
Our findings extend those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) by providing new and 
integral information in the assessment of the overall effectiveness of the PPDA Episodes.  
To understand the short-term effectiveness of PPDA Episodes requires the 
disentanglement of the concentration-reducing and information-provision channels of 
impact. As air quality improvement and avoidance behaviors impose different costs on 
the economy and society, the correct attribution of the benefits of the Episodes is critical 
for the future management of the negative effects of air quality in Santiago. Additionally, 
our results are important for informing the implementation of short-term approaches for 
addressing spikes in air pollution in other major urban centers. Given the growing 
prevalence of extreme air pollution events in metro areas from Europe to Latin America 
and Asia, such a focused understanding of the Chilean success story is more important 
than ever.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on 
pollution in Santiago and the institutional setting.  Section 3 describes our data and 
empirical approach, and Section 4 presents a discussion of our main results.  In Section 5 
we conclude the paper.  
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3.2. Background 
Santiago, Chile has historically suffered from poor air quality being particularly 
prone to pollution due to its geographic location at the base of the Andes mountain range.  
In this location Santiago frequently experiences temperature inversion layers, which 
reduce vertical atmospheric mixing and keep pollutant emissions on the ground (Prendez, 
Alvarado and Serey 2011).  Air pollution is of particular concern in the winter months 
(April-August) when the inversion layers lay closer the ground, trapping and 
concentrating pollutants (Rutllant and Garreaud 1995; Gramsch et al. 2006).   
While the government of Chile constructed and began to implement policies that 
identified and announced pollution Episodes to address growing concerns of pollution in 
the early 1990s, the PPDA was officially published in 1997 after which the policy was 
strictly enforced.  The policy designed a tiered labeling system for the announced 
Episodes.  Episodes encompass three event labels, “Alerts”, “Pre-Emergencies” and 
“Emergencies”, announced separately and distinguished to signal increasing levels of 
pollution threshold exceedance. The Alert, Pre-Emergency and Emergency Episodes 
were designed to be announced if daily PM10 concentrations are predicted to exceed 195 
µg/m3, 240 µg/m3 and 320 µg/m3, respectively.  On the day of an Episode, the 
government imposes several restrictions to reduce pollution levels, and the specific 
restrictions vary in intensity by level of Episode.  See Table B.1 in the Appendix B for a 
detailed account of the restrictions associated with each Episode level.   
Prior to the establishment of the PPDA in 1997, Episodes announcements were 
generally inconsistent compared to the period after 1997.  Between 1989 and 1997, PM10 
levels exceeded 240 µg/m3 on 148 days; however less than 60 of these days were 
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announced as Episodes.  Comparatively, nearly 100% of days deemed Episodes between 
1997 and 2008 were announced (see Figure 3.1).  Since Episode announcements prior to 
the implementation of the PPDA were generally ineffective, we find days in the post-
PPDA period when Episodes were announced that are similar to days in the pre-PPDA 
period when Episodes should have been announced but were not and exploit this 
difference to identify the effect of an announcement on PM10 and mortality outcomes.   
 
Figure 3.1: Episode occurrences and announcements before and after PPDA Episode 
implementation (Mullins and Bharadwaj 2014).  
 
 
 
3.3  Data and Methodology   
 
3.3.1 Data Description  
 
To identify the behavioral effect of episode announcements, we combine 
observations on PM10 concentrations, weather, Episode announcements and mortality at 
the daily level from 1989 to 2008.  The PM10 concentration data are from Chile’s 
Ministry of the Environment, which maintains data collected by the MACAM 1 and 
MACAM 2 monitor networks on PM10 concentrations prior to 1997 and after1997, 
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respectively.  The MACAM 2 network currently includes nine monitors spread across 
Santiago, specifically located to observe concentrations at both hotspot and typical 
pollution levels (Gramsch et al. 2006).  As only three sites were monitored consistently 
across our period of study, we use PM10 data from only the sites, Parque O'Higgins, La 
Paz (or Independencia) and Las Condes, and average the daily mean PM10 concentration 
across these stations.2   
Since weather conditions are likely to be correlated with pollution levels and 
mortality, we include various weather controls in our analysis.  We obtain hourly weather 
data from the Summary of the Day data series from the U.S. National Climatic Data 
Center (NCDC) and use daily mean wind, precipitation and temperature observations as 
controls.  We also combine information on Episode announcements with the PM10 and 
weather data.  The Santiago Metropolitan Region’s Ministry of Health provides the dates 
of each episode and corresponding pollution levels.  
Finally, we use aggregate daily mortality data and merge it with the PM10 
concentration, weather and Episode data. The mortality data are from the Chilean 
Ministry of Health’s Department of Statistics and Health information.  Data on death 
counts are available starting in 1992 while data on cause-of-death begins in 1994.  The 
cause-of-death data include information on date of death, age at death, and International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes for primary and secondary causes of death.  Table 
3.1 details the means of variables used in our analysis for the pre-PPDA and post-PPDA 
periods. 
 
                                               
2 Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) demonstrate that the effects of Episodes on PM10 levels and mortality are 
generally robust to the inclusion of all monitors in their analysis.   
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Table 3.1: Comparison of means before and after PPDA Episode implementation for 
variables used in analysis. 
  Potential Matched Days Potential Treated Days 
  1989-1996 1997-2008 
Daily Mean PM10 (µg/m3) 106.15 69.28 
Daily Temperature (℉) 57.85 58.41 
Daily Wind Speed (knots) 4.72 4.8 
Daily Precipitation (inches) 0.03 0.03 
Daily Deaths 77.15 85.79 
Daily Deaths Over 64 47.7 57.45 
Daily Respiratory Deaths 10.2 9.22 
Daily Respiratory Deaths Over 64 7.9 7.76 
Daily Circulatory Deaths 21.76 23.92 
Daily Circulatory Deaths Over 64 17.23 19.12 
Daily Cancer Deaths 17.21 20.17 
Daily Cancer Deaths Over 64 10.72 13.22 
Daily Accidental Deaths 7.98 5.63 
Daily Accidental Deaths Over 64 1.45 1.19 
Avg. Population 5,496,505 6,342,665 
Avg. Population Over 64 343,922 469,945 
Avg. # Emergency Episodes per Year 0.75 0.17 
Avg. # Pre-Emergency Episodes per 
Year 6.63 7.42 
 
 
3.3.2 Methodology    
 
While Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) suggest that the PPDA Episodes have 
resulted in reduced mortality, it remains unclear if this is, at least in part, a consequence 
of the behavioral effect of Episode announcements as opposed to solely the biological 
effect of the policy’s successful reduction in short-term spikes in PM10.  Therefore, our 
empirical strategy seeks to separate the behavioral effects of Episode announcements 
from the total effect of the announcements on mortality.  Adapting Neidell’s (2009) 
model, the total effect of Episodes on mortality can be explained in the model below: 
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éèåsãê+sx = w(ë*Mg(Å]+íèìrí) ∗ ãkè+ìã,îr(Å]+íèìrí), X)																																					(3.1) 
 
In Equation (3.1) mortality is a function of exposure to PM10 concentrations, which is 
represented by the interaction term ë*Mg(Å]+íèìrí) ∗ ãkè+ìã,îr(Å]+íèìrí).  Also, 
Equation (3.1) indicates that both ambient levels of pollution and behavioral responses to 
pollution levels are a function of Episode announcements.  Finally, from this relationship 
it is evident that the effect of air pollution on mortality outcomes cannot be perfectly 
explained by PM10 concentrations if individuals engage in behavior that limits or avoids 
exposure, thereby reducing the effect.  The term Z includes all other factor that affect 
mortality (ie- temperature, pre-existing conditions, income, etc.).  The total effect of 
Episode announcements on mortality is given by: 
 ìéèåsãê+sxìÅ]+íèìr = ïéèåsãê+sxïë*Mg ∙ ïë*MgïÅ]+íèìr + ïéèåsãê+sxïãkè+ìã,îr ∙ ïãkè+ìã,îrïÅ]+íèìr 																								(3.2) 
 
In Equation (3.2) the first term, $ñóò@ôö?@Ñ$õúùû ∙ $õúùû$ül?†óf°, is the biological effect on mortality 
resulting from PM10 concentration reductions after Episode announcements.  The second 
term, $ñóò@ôö?@Ñ$ô¢ó?fô£§° ∙ $ô¢ó?fô£§°$ül?†óf° 	, is the behavioral effect of Episode announcements.  The 
estimates from Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) capture the total effect, fñóò@ôö?@Ñfül?†óf°† , while 
we estimate only the behavioral effect.3   
                                               
3 Since we use different treatment and control groups to identify the total effects and behavioral effects, our 
behavioral effect estimates are not perfectly decomposed from the total effects estimates as suggested by 
this model.  This model is presented to provide a basis for our analysis, where ideally we could use the 
same sample to identify both the total and behavioral effects.  
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3.3.2.1 Total Effects of Episode Announcements  
To estimate the total effect of Episode announcements on mortality, Mullins and 
Bharadwaj (2014) use a two-part analysis.  First, they establish an appropriate 
counterfactual to Episodes announced in the post-PPDA period by matching pollution 
and weather conditions on days immediately before an Episode announcement in the 
post-PPDA period to observationally similar days (but not Episode announcements) in 
the pre-PPDA period.  Using the matched days in the pre-PPDA period as the control, 
Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) use a difference-in-differences (DID) model to isolate the 
effect of Episodes on mortality controlling for mean PM10, weather and temporal fixed 
effects.  Since pollution and weather conditions are similar in 5-day intervals in both the 
control and treatment groups, the differences in deaths following an Episode 
announcement in the post-PPDA period should be due only to the Episode 
announcement.  
 In the first part of our analysis, we replicate the results of Mullins and Bharadwaj 
(2014) using a slightly different identification strategy from their original analysis.  In our 
paper the basis of our identification strategy for the total effects of Episode 
announcements is that for which we use to identify the behavioral effects.  To identify the 
total effects of Episode announcements, we follow a similar identification strategy to the 
one used to identify the behavioral effect of episodes described below in Section 3.2.2.  
In order to compare the estimates from our behavioral effect analysis, it is crucial that we 
employ consistent methods.   
 In estimating both the total effect and behavioral effect of announcements, we 
restrict our sample to include only Episodes that occurred without another Episode 
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announcement within five days before or after to avoid potential confounding factors 
associated with consecutive Episode announcements. The Government of Chile 
announced ninety-one episodes during the post-PPDA period; however, with the 
restriction of stand-alone Episodes, our sample includes 35 of these Episodes.4   
To ensure that any effects on mortality are a result of the Episode announcements, 
the control group must also have experienced similar pollution and weather conditions in 
the days leading up to an Episode in the post-PPDA period or what should have been in 
Episode in the pre-PPDA period.  Since there does exist periods of days that are exact 
matches between the pre- and post-PPDA period, propensity score matching allows us to 
identify similar matches (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  To estimate propensity scores, 
we run a Logit model to predict the probability that an Episode is announced on any 
given day based on PM10 concentrations and weather conditions in the five days before, 
an Episode announcement.  The specify the following model: 
 	x@ = P + ∑ JQ^ ë*Mg@L^ + •bLa¶ q^ K +ß^hM ®©™b¶e + ´¨≠bÆb¶m + S@																													(3.3) 
 
In Equation (3.3), x@ is an indicator that equals one if an Episode was announced on day t 
in the post-PPDA period and equals zero if day t is a day in the pre-PPDA period. ë*Mg@L^ is the daily mean PM10 concentration j days before day t, and •bLa¶ 	is a vector of 
observed weather variables j days before day t including a discretized measure of mean 
                                               
4 Graff Zivin and Neidell’s (2009) results indicate that for consecutive Episode announcements, observed 
behavioral responses are typical most prevalent only on the first day of announcement, which suggests that 
using only stand-alone Episodes would capture the strongest effect of avoidance behavior on Episode 
announcements.   
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temperature (mean temperature is rounded to the nearest multiple of five), average wind 
speed and precipitation.  ®©™@ and ´¨≠bÆ@ are day-of-week and month-level fixed 
effects, respectively.  We include the day-of-week fixed effects to account for potential 
dependence of Episode announcements on the day-of-week while monthly fixed effects 
are included to capture seasonal variation in weather patterns and potentially Episode 
announcements.   P, Q^ , q^ , e	and m are estimated coefficients, and S@ is the error term. 
 Using the coefficients estimated by the Logit model, we plug the observed values 
for each pre- and post-PPDA episode into the model to obtain predicted values of x@, 
which is the propensity score for day t.  We use a five Nearest Neighbor matching 
approach to identify the five closet matches of days in the post-PPDA period to days in 
the pre-PPDA period.  Including multiple matches reduces variance; however, larger 
values of n-Nearest Neighbors can reduce the quality of the matches.  To further ensure 
quality of matches, we include only matches with a common support, which results in 
dropping one post-PPDA Episode, and our final sample for the difference-in-difference 
regressions includes 34 out of 35 post-PPDA events (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 
1999).   
Table 3.2 compares the means of the pollution and weather variables in the five 
days before an Episode in the control and treatment groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
Table 3.2: Balance table comparing means for treatment and control groups matching on 
pollution and weather in the five days prior to an Episode announcement. 
  Means  t-test for  Equal Means 
Lag Variable Treated Control Percent 
Bias 
t-stat p-value 
-5 PM10 90.22 90.83 -1.5 -0.08 0.94 
-4 PM10 85.18 87.56 -5.7 -0.31 0.76 
-3 PM10 93.83 92.08 3.7 0.19 0.85 
-2 PM10 129.99 127.41 5.8 0.25 0.80 
-1 PM10 133.42 140.31 -15.9 -0.63 0.53 
       
-5 Discrete Temp. 48.82 48.38 6.7 0.29 0.78 
-4 Discrete Temp. 48.82 48.29 8.4 0.35 0.73 
-3 Discrete Temp. 47.65 47.18 7.2 0.29 0.77 
-2 Discrete Temp. 47.94 47.47 6.7 0.28 0.78 
-1 Discrete Temp. 49.12 48.50 9.6 0.40 0.69 
       
-5 Wind Speed 3.07 3.09 -1.2 -0.06 0.96 
-4 Wind Speed 3.63 3.67 -3.4 -0.15 0.88 
-3 Wind Speed 3.51 3.66 -11.5 -0.42 0.67 
-2 Wind Speed 2.63 2.80 -14.2 -0.68 0.50 
-1 Wind Speed 2.70 2.67 2.2 0.11 0.91 
       
-5 Precipitation 0.03 0.02 9.6 0.42 0.68 
-4 Precipitation 0.05 0.03 12.7 0.51 0.61 
-3 Precipitation 0.07 0.07 -1.3 -0.04 0.97 
-2 Precipitation 0.00 0.00 1.9 0.56 0.58 
-1 Precipitation 0.00 0.00 0 0 1.00 
       
Observations  34 106    
 
  
Table 3.2, along with Figure 3.2, supports that our matches do have observationally 
similar PM10 concentrations across the compared days.  Additionally, Figure 3.2, 
demonstrates that while pollution conditions in the matched days are similar in the five 
days leading up to an Episode announcement in the post-PPDA period, PM10 
concentrations are significantly higher on the day of and five days following an Episode 
announcement in the matched days.   
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of daily mean PM10 levels for treatment and control groups 
matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior to an Episode announcement. 
 
 
 
 After identifying the treatment and control groups, we implement the DID 
regressions to compare the difference in PM10 concentrations and mortality outcomes in 
the five days following an Episode to the five days following a matched non-Episode to 
identify the effect of information.5  The DID approach allows us to appropriately 
compare PM10 and mortality outcomes in the treatment and control groups by controlling 
for systematic differences between the groups.  This strategy first differences the 
mortality outcomes for days before and after an Episode (treatment group) or non-
Episode (control group), and the difference between these two groups gives the effect of 
                                               
5 While the outcome of interest in this paper is changes in mortality in response to Episode announcements, 
we assess the impacts on PM10 to ensure our replication of Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) results are 
consistent with their findings.  
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an Episode announcement on mortality outcomes.  To further control for systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups, we include weights from the 
matching procedure in the DID regressions (Hirano and Imbens 2001; Imbens 2004).   
We run the DID regressions on six different samples, where each sample captures 
the effect on PM10 or mortality on the day of an Episode up to five days after, for which 
each sample includes one day before an Episode (t=-1) and one day of or after (t = 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, or 5).  For instance, the first regression captures the difference in mortality between 
the day of an Episode and the day prior.  The second regression examines the difference 
in mortality between the day after an Episode and the day prior, and so on.  The sixth 
regression represents the difference in mortality between five days after an Episode and 
the day prior.  Additionally, we examine ten different mortality outcomes: all ages for all 
causes of death, all ages for deaths caused by respiratory illnesses, all ages for deaths 
caused by circulatory illnesses, all ages for deaths caused by cancer, all ages for deaths 
caused by accidents, and all of the above but for a subsample of the population over 64.  
Therefore, we estimate 66 regressions in total: 6 to identify the PM10 impacts and 60 to 
identify the effects on mortality.  Using ordinary least squares, the DID specification for 
the 66 regressions is:  
   (U?,@ − U?,LM) = P + ∞ ∗ Å? + ∑ ±•`La¶ q^ ≤ + ∑ (•`á≥¶ ¥µ) +@µhg ®©™¶?e + ´¨≠bÆ¶?ß^hM m +S?,@																																																																																																																																																			(3.4)   
 
Equation (3.4) i indicates the date of an Episode (in the treatment group) or matched day 
(in the control group).  t is the distance of the sample observation from the associated 
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event i, where t can take the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.  U?,LM is the PM10 or mortality 
outcome for t set equal to the day before event i, and the term (U?,@ − U?,LM) is the 
difference between the PM10 or mortality outcome for t=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 and day t=-1.  Å? is an indicator that equals one if the observed day is associated with an Episode that 
occurred in the post-PPDA period and zero if the observed day is a day in the pre-PPDA 
period.  The term, ∑ ±•′`Laq^ ≤ + ∑ (•bá≥¶ ¥µ)@µhgß^hM , is a vector of observed pollution and 
weather conditions for the five days preceding event i up day t.  The PM10 regressions 
include mean temperature, average wind speed and precipitation, while the mortality 
regressions include the afore mentioned controls in addition to mean PM10 
concentrations.  As in the Logit model, ®©™? and ´¨≠bÆ? are day-of-week and month-
level fixed effects, respectively.  P, ∞, ∑, V, Q^ , q^ , ∏µ, ¥µ, e	and m are estimated 
coefficients and S?@ is the error term. 
 
3.3.2.2 Behavioral Effects of Episode Announcements  
 
Our analysis to identify the behavioral effects of Episode announcements is 
similar to the analysis described above to identify the total effects of Episode 
announcements.  Identification of the behavioral effects, however, requires the inclusion 
of additional controls in the estimation of the propensity scores.  We now match periods 
including the days immediately leading up to, the day of, and the days immediately after 
an Episode announcement to days with observationally similar PM10 concentrations and 
weather conditions occurring in the pre-PPDA period. Using these new propensity scores, 
we estimate DID models to compare the difference in mortality outcomes in the days 
following an Episode to days following a matched non-Episode to identify the effect of 
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information.  Since PM10 is held constant across the treatment and control groups, any 
differences in health outcomes following an Episode reflects differential exposure to 
PM10 as a result of individuals’ choices to about their outdoor activities in response to the 
provided information.   
To estimate the propensity scores, we specify the following Logit model: 
 	x@ = P + ∑ JQ^ ∗ ë*Mg@L^ + •bLa¶ q^ K +ß^hM ∑ ±∏µ ∗ ë*Mg@áµ + •bá≥¶ ¥µ≤ + ®©™′@ +ßµhg´¨≠bÆ′@ m + S@																																																																																																																											(3.5)	  
 
The variables in Equation (3.5) are identical to Equation (3.3) with the addition of the 
term, ∑ ±∏µ ∗ ë*Mg@áµ + •bá≥¶ ¥µ≤ßµhg .  Holding pollution constant before and after an 
Episode announcement requires that we match on both the days prior to an Episode, the 
day of and the days after.  Therefore, ë*10@áµ is the daily mean PM10 concentration k 
days after day t and •bá≥¶  is a vector of observed weather variables k days after day t 
including a discretized measure of mean temperature (mean temperature is rounded to the 
nearest multiple of five), average wind speed and precipitation.  P, Q^ , q^ , ∏µ, ¥µ, e	and m 
are estimated coefficients, and S@ is the error term. 
 After obtaining the propensity scores (the predicted values from the Equation 
(3.5)), as in the previous analysis described in Section 3.2.1, we use the Nearest Neighbor 
approach to identify the five closet matches of days in the post-PPDA period to days in 
the pre-PPDA period and include only matches with a common support.  This results in 
dropping eight out 35 post-PPDA Episodes, and our final sample for the difference-in-
difference regressions includes 27 post-PPDA events.  
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  Table 3.3 compares the mean PM10 concentrations in the five days before, day of, 
and five days after an Episode in the control (Episode days) and treatment groups 
(matched non-Episode days).  See Table B.2 in Appendix B in the Appendix for 
comparison of the other covariates between the control and treated groups.  Table 3.3, 
along with Figure 3.3, provides supports that our matches do have observationally similar 
PM10 concentrations across the compared days. 
 
Table 3.3: Balance table comparing means for PM10 concentrations for treatment and 
control groups matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five 
days after an Episode announcement. 
  Means  t-test for  Equal Means 
Lag/Lead Variable Treated Control Percent 
Bias 
t-stat p-value 
-5 PM10 96.34 95.71 1.5 0.08 0.94 
-4 PM10 89.20 87.90 3.1 0.14 0.89 
-3 PM10 97.53 101.22 -7.7 -0.30 0.76 
-2 PM10 129.94 139.07 -20.6 -0.71 0.48 
-1 PM10 129.42 127.82 3.7 0.11 0.91 
0 PM10 102.85 100.07 6.8 0.24 0.81 
1 PM10 92.06 99.80 -17.3 -0.70 0.48 
2 PM10 88.38 96.09 -16.0 -0.74 0.46 
3 PM10 92.41 94.83 -5.2 -0.23 0.82 
4 PM10 94.47 98.80 -9.3 -0.43 0.67 
5 PM10 93.89 98.51 -10.1 -0.48 0.63 
       
Observations  27 64    
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of daily mean PM10 levels for treatment and control groups 
matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five days after an 
Episode announcement. 
 
 
 
 Like the analysis in the previous section, we use the identified treatment and 
control groups from the propensity matching to estimate 66 DID regressions: 6 to identify 
the PM10 impacts and 60 to identify the effects on mortality.  Recall that we run the DID 
regressions on six different samples, where each sample captures the effect on PM10 or 
mortality on the day of an Episode up to five days after, for which each sample includes 
one day before an Episode (t=-1) and one day of or after (t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5).6  We 
examine the same ten different mortality outcomes as listed in Section 3.2.1.  Since our 
                                               
6 Again, the outcome of interest in this paper is changes in mortality in response to Episode 
announcements, we estimate same regressions as in Section 3.2.1 using differences in PM10 as the 
dependent variables as an additional check that PM10 concentrations are in fact held constant between the 
treatment and control groups. 
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identification strategy for the behavioral effects is the same as the total effects, we 
estimate the DID specified exactly as Equation (3.4) presented in Section 3.2.1.  The 
analysis to determine the behavioral effects; however, uses a different sample of treated 
and control days based on the earlier differences in the matching process.   
 
3.4. Results and Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Effects of Episode Announcements on PM10 Concentrations 
 
We first present our results of the total and behavioral effects of Episode 
announcements on PM10 concentrations.  The first column in Table 3.4 shows the total 
effect of Episode announcements on PM10 concentrations on the day of and five days 
after an announcement.  The second column shows the behavioral effect of Episode 
announcements on PM10 concentrations on the day of and five days after an 
announcement.  While the effects on PM10 concentrations are not the focus of this paper, 
Table 3.4 demonstrates two important results.  First, column 1 demonstrates that our 
replicated results are consistent with the total effects of Episodes on PM10 concentrations 
presented by Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014).  We similarly find that on the day of an 
Episode and in the five days after, PM10 concentrations are significant reduced.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are also similar to those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014).  
Second, column 2 supports that PM10 concentrations are in fact held constant between 
the treatment and control groups on the day of and 5 days after an Episode as none of the 
estimates are statistically significant.   
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Table 3.4: Differences-in-differences results: Effect of Episodes on mean PM10 
concentrations. 
* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.0 
 
 
3.4.2 Total Effects of Episode Announcements 
 
Table 3.5 summarizes the results from our replication of Mullins and Bharadwaj’s 
(2014) estimates of the total effects of Episode announcements on mortality by cause-of-
death and age group.  Each cell in Table 3.5 is a coefficient (the coefficient of interest 
from Equation (3.4), ∞) from a different regression and includes mortality outcomes for a 
subpopulation of individuals over 64, which represents a more health-sensitive group to 
pollution spikes.  The coefficient estimates in Columns 1 and 6 are consistent with main 
conclusions from Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) analysis that deaths, particularly 
among the elderly, are reduced as a result of Episode announcements.   
  
Total Effects 
Analysis  
Behavioral Effects 
Analysis 
 
Difference from Day -1 to Day of Episode -16.527** 5.563 
 (6.50) (7.34) 
Difference from Day -1 to Day 1 -31.037*** -2.037 
 (8.70) (8.72) 
Difference from Day -1 to Day 2 -21.905** -3.819 
 (9.15) (10.51) 
Difference from Day -1 to Day 3 -22.033** 3.345 
 (9.24) (10.95) 
Difference from Day -1 to Day 4 -20.766** 2.805 
 (9.19) (9.39) 
Difference from Day -1 to Day 5 -33.351*** -4.369 
 (9.17) (8.97) 
   
Pre-Episode Daily Mean 106.527 108.484 
N 140 91 
Treatment 34 27 
Control 106 64 
 84 
Table 3.5: Total effects of episode announcements on deaths by cause-of-death and age group. 
  Deaths All Ages   Deaths Age Over 64 
  Cum. All  
Cum. 
Respiratory 
Cum. 
Circulatory  
Cum. 
Cancer 
Cum. 
Accidental    Cum. All  
Cum. 
Respirator
y  
Cum. 
Circulatory  
Cum. 
Cancer  
Cum. 
Accidental  
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day of Episode 
-10.069*** -0.873 -2.217 -3.326** 0.925 -5.179** -0.059 -1.756 -2.375 0.695* 
(3.08) (1.56) (2.21) (1.55) (0.81) (2.55) (1.31) (1.79) (1.59) (0.42) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 1 
-22.023*** -3.958 -8.076* -6.065 1.592 -14.460*** -3.307 -7.161** -2.921 1.459* 
(5.95) (2.68) (4.07) (4.29) (1.71) (5.14) (2.27) (3.39) (3.89) (0.86) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 2 
-23.477*** -6.282 -11.126* -6.484 1.859 -15.737** -6.046* -8.854* -2.473 2.621** 
(8.17) (3.96) (6.02) (5.57) (2.85) (6.75) (3.30) (5.03) (4.71) (1.28) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 3 
-28.755** -12.183** -15.614* -6.595 0.792 -22.474** -12.679** -13.009* -2.239 4.196** 
(11.68) (5.81) (8.22) (7.83) (3.68) (9.81) (5.29) (7.01) (7.49) (1.84) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 4 
-44.555*** -15.047** -26.150** -4.948 1.320 -33.354*** -14.935** -19.244** -1.124 4.052* 
(15.29) (6.79) (10.05) (8.99) (4.76) (12.59) (6.12) (9.32) (8.72) (2.29) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 5 
-54.559*** -18.564** -23.253* -1.008 1.295 -42.955*** -19.799** -17.023 3.206 4.414* 
(18.69) (8.38) (13.53) (10.73) (5.34) (15.67) (7.91) (12.76) (9.25) (2.63) 
            
Pre-Episode Daily 
Mean 
94.229 12.718 27.624 20.412 4.435  64.641 10.971 22.365 13.282 1.082 
N 132 106 106 106 106  132 106 106 106 106 
Treatment  34 34 34 34 34  34 34 34 34 34 
Control 98 72 72 72 72   98 72 72 72 72 
* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.01 
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Our estimates, however, are generally of larger magnitude and of greater statistical 
significance than those of Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014), especially the impacts of 
Episodes on respiratory and circulatory deaths.  Since we expect PM10 to have the most 
immediate impact of respiratory and circulatory systems, these results fit with our 
understanding of how exposure to PM10 can be harmful and therefore how avoidance of 
PM10 might reduce mortality.  Additionally, that we find little impact of Episodes on 
cancer deaths suggests death reductions can be attributed to PM10 reductions as cancer 
deaths should be the least responsive to air quality improvements in the short-term.  
 Finally, unlike Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014), Table 3.5 also shows statistically 
significant increases in accidental deaths among the elderly.  An increase in accidental 
deaths, particular among the elderly, could be a result of higher levels of public transport 
and street sweeping are provided, leading to increased pedestrian related accidents.  
These types of accidents are much more likely to lead to death than accidents between 
cars, especially in urban environments where traffic speeds generally aren't that high.  
 While our analysis preserves the main conclusions from Mullins and Bharadwaj’s 
(2014) analysis, the differences in the magnitude and significance of the estimates should 
be due to the additional controls implemented in our regression specifications.  Mullins 
and Bharadwaj (2014) control only for pollution and weather in the five days prior to an 
Episode announcement or matched day in the pre-PPDA period.  However, given that our 
dependent variable captures differences in PM10 and mortality up to five days after an 
Episode, it is important to control for pollution and weather conditions before an 
Episodes and on all other days for which pollution and mortality outcomes are being 
considered (see Equation (3.4)). 
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Of final note, recall that the effects presented in Table 3.5 capture the net effect of 
Episodes and do not identify the effects of any avoidance behaviors undertaken in 
response to pollution information.  Therefore, these estimates are the basis for our 
analysis of the behavioral effects, which we discuss in the following section. 
 
3.4.3 Behavioral Effects of Episode Announcements 
 
Tables 3.6 summarizes our main results, the behavioral effects of Episode 
announcements on mortality by cause-of-death and age group.  Each cell in Table 3.6 is a 
coefficient (the coefficient of interest from Equation (3.4), !) from a different regression 
and includes mortality outcomes for a subpopulation of individuals over 64, which 
represents a more health-sensitive group to pollution spikes.  In Table 3.6, we see 
significantly fewer deaths in the five days following an Episode announcement compared 
to when an Episode is not announced holding PM10 constant.  The coefficients are 
statistically significant and negative for deaths among the general population.  
That deaths in particular are significantly lower in the treatment group (Episodes 
were announced in response to pollution spikes) compared to the control (Episodes were 
not announced in response to pollution spikes) suggests individuals are experiencing less 
pollutant exposure.  Because days in the treatment and control groups have the same 
PM10 concentrations, the differences in mortality outcomes following an Episode 
announcement are not attributable to different ambient PM10 levels but instead to the 
information content of the Episode and the resulting avoidance behavior that is 
undertaken.  Our results support that individual avoid outdoor activities in response to the 
Episode information and getting near-zero PM10 exposure as opposed to some PM10 
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exposure.  Average PM10 levels after an episode and on matched days are between 85-100 
µg/m3 (see Figure 3.3).  As the WHO guideline for PM10 is 50 µg/m3 (WHO 2011), 
going outside after an episode could still be harmful, and we might not see significant 
reductions in death even due to episodes if individuals are not engaging in avoidance 
behavior.  Additionally, examining the cause of death results, we find some reductions in 
respiratory related deaths among the general population and elderly in the first two day 
following an Episode announcement.  The coefficients on circulatory and cancer deaths 
are generally statistically insignificant.  
Although these behavioral effects are not a direct decomposition of the total 
effects presented in Section 4.2, we can compare the magnitudes of the coefficients for 
the estimated behavioral effects relative to the total effects.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients on the behavioral effects are nearly equal to the total effects on the day of 
and first couple of days after an Episode announcement.  These results demonstrate, first, 
that information is a crucial component of the PPDA in mortality reduction.  In fact, 
given the significant reductions in PM10 concentrations as a result of Episode 
announcements (see column 1 of Table 3.4), that a large proportion of the reductions in 
mortality seem to be a result of avoidance behavior highlights that information may be 
even more important than it appears ex-ante.   Second, our results suggest that individuals 
do respond to information on air pollution, but the health benefits of undertaking 
avoidance behaviors are largely realized on the day of a first couple of days after an 
Episode announcement.   
Finally, holding pollution constant, Episode announcements still result in 
statistically significant increases in accidental deaths among the elderly on the day of and 
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two days after an Episode announcement.  As mentioned above, this could be a result of 
increased pedestrian related accidents due to a city-wide efforts and policy-mandates to 
discourage vehicle usage.  However, that these effects only persist for a few days after 
controlling for pollution, further supports that if individuals are changing their driving 
behaviors, these behaviors last for only a short time after an announcement.  If most of 
these accidental deaths can be attributed to pedestrian-related incidents, an increase in 
accidental does not necessarily mean that more people are going outside, and therefore do 
not contradict that individuals are not undertaking avoidance behaviors in response to 
Episode announcements.  Additionally, since homes  often present many hazards that 
cause accidental deaths, the increase in accidental deaths could also be indicating that 
individuals are staying at home more on days following an Episode announcement.  
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Table 3.6: Behavioral effects of episode announcements on deaths by cause-of-death and age group. 
  Deaths All Ages   Deaths Age Over 64 
  Cum. All  
Cum. 
Respiratory 
Cum. 
Circulatory  
Cum. 
Cancer 
Cum. 
Accidental    Cum. All  
Cum. 
Respirator
y  
Cum. 
Circulatory  
Cum. 
Cancer  
Cum. 
Accidental  
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day of Episode 
-8.980*** -3.048** 1.033 -1.128 0.314 -4.483 -2.767** 1.630 -0.310 1.196*** 
(3.30) (1.48) (3.00) (2.25) (1.21) (2.84) (1.33) (2.88) (2.24) (0.44) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 1 
-18.465*** -6.490** 0.944 -0.799 0.325 -11.599* -6.255** 1.643 0.392 2.046** 
(6.50) (3.04) (4.50) (4.69) (2.52) (6.15) (2.49) (3.95) (4.77) (0.92) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 2 
-24.534*** -4.713 -0.259 4.012 0.409 -15.185** -5.030 0.455 4.271 3.490** 
(8.43) (3.89) (6.85) (6.99) (3.67) (7.44) (3.59) (6.00) (7.34) (1.50) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 3 
-21.692** -2.853 -6.340 3.120 -0.279 -16.264* -5.618 -4.832 2.258 3.092 
(10.43) (4.69) (8.40) (9.01) (5.42) (9.53) (4.72) (7.42) (10.40) (2.05) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 4 
-32.790** -1.936 -14.157* -1.076 -0.032 -25.821** -4.760 -10.444 1.207 3.324 
(13.22) (6.26) (7.48) (11.11) (7.29) (11.55) (4.20) (7.17) (11.05) (2.75) 
Difference from Day 
-1 to Day 5 
-23.086 14.326 -10.981 5.981 -1.742 -22.292* 5.783 -12.769 18.084 1.696 
(13.72) (10.62) (13.12) (12.39) (7.74) (13.00) (6.47) (11.00) (12.68) (2.30) 
 
Pre-Episode Daily 
Mean 
91.511 12.504 26.252 20.185 4.156  62.281 10.711 21.363 13.111 0.956 
N 83 68 68 68 68  83 68 68 68 68 
Treatment  27 27 27 27 27  27 27 27 27 27 
Control 56 41 41 41 41   56 41 41 41 41 
* - significant at 0.10; **- significant at 0.05; ***- significant at 0.01
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
 As improving air quality around the world continues to be both vital and urgent, 
understanding the mechanisms of effective policy interventions is equally important.  The 
Chilean PPDA offers promise that short-term spikes in air pollution can be mitigated 
along with the associated mortality effects.  With the announcement of Episodes on days 
projected to exceed pollution thresholds, the PPDA in effect works on two dimensions- it 
restricts pollution-generating activities and provides information to the public about 
environmental risk.   
 In this paper we decompose Mullins and Bharadwaj’s (2014) estimates of the total 
effects of Episode announcements on mortality to separate the behavioral effects based 
on provided information from the pure biological effects of PM10 concentration 
reductions.  While Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find that Episodes significantly reduce 
mortality, our results suggest that a large portion of such reductions are due to avoidance 
behaviors on the day of and couple of days following an Episode only.  The remaining 
mortality effects, which Mullins and Bharadwaj (2014) find last up to five days after an 
Episode occurrence, then appear to be mostly a result of improvements in air quality.  
 These findings have strong implications for policymakers in thinking about the 
value of information.  Our study, along with others, suggests that individuals do pay 
attention to public information and respond by changing their behavior.  Especially when 
health outcomes are of concern, it may be possible to design policies with relatively low 
enforcement costs by disseminating information to the public.    
 Along these lines, however, an area for future research is the investigation of the 
relationship between public announcements on consecutive days and behavioral 
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responses.  Our paper focuses only on stand-alone Episodes and does not analyze the 
behavioral responses when Episodes are announced on consecutive days.  Given that it 
becomes increasingly costly to substitute away from outdoor activities (or continue other 
exposure reducing behaviors) over periods of days relative to one day, it is possible that 
behavioral responses may diminish across consecutive announcements (as Graff Zivin 
and Neidell (2009) find is the case with smog alerts in Los Angeles).  This is also 
suggested by our results with the diminishing reductions in mortality in the days 
following an Episode announcement after holding pollution constant.  In the case of the 
PPDA in which Episodes are frequently announced consecutively, it is important to 
identify the length of time over which the behavioral effect of Episodes is effective.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
Table A.1: Timeline of selected events following the Deepwater Horizon well explosion. 
Date   Event  
April 20 
 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Macondo 
Prospect. 
April 24 
 
Spill responders estimate oil is leaking at a rate of 1,000 
barrels per day. 
April 28 
 
Spill responders estimate that oil is leaking at a rate of 5,000 
barrels per day.   
April 29-30 
 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida declare states 
of emergency. 
April 30   First oil washes up in Louisiana.  
May 2  Government begins federal fishery closures.  
May 6-7  BP's effort to contain the well with a cofferdam fails.  
May 12  
 
BP releases first public video of leak, prompting new flow 
rate estimates. 
May 26-28  BP's second attempt to kill the well fails. 
May 27 
 
Investigators announce a lower bound estimate of 12,000-
25,000 barrels leaking per day. Scientists announce spill is 
bigger than the Exxon Valdez.  
June 4  Tar balls seen on beaches in Pensacola, Florida. 
June 10 
 
Flow rate estimate increases to 25,000 -30,000 barrels per 
day. 
June 14  Florida announces its first state fishery closure. 
June 15  President Obama discusses spill in first Oval Office address.  
June 25- July 2 
 
Hurricane Alex causes abandoned efforts and more oil 
onshore.  
June 28 
 
Escambia County, Florida issues a health advisory for 
Pensacola beaches. 
July 2  
 
NOAA releases report predicting future oil wash-ups on 
Gulf coast shorelines.  
July 15  BP caps the well, stopping the oil leak.  
July 22-24  Tropical Storm Bonnie leads to clean-up crew evacuations.  
August 4  BP announces static kill is successful. 
August 4 
 
Government releases report detailing the current status of 
the fate of leaked oil. 
September 19   BP completes relief well, shutting down the Macondo well.  
Sources: Florida SERT (2017); National Hurricane Center (2017); Graham et al. (2011); Biello (2010); 
CNN (2010); NOAA (2010); Time Magazine (2010).   
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Table A.2:  Regression results for identification of treatment period. 
Variables Impact on ln (Price) 
Coastal zone sale February 2010 -0.0046 
 (0.0349) 
Coastal zone sale March 2010 -0.0095 
 (0.0269) 
Coastal zone sale April 2010 -0.0229 
 (0.0207) 
Coastal zone sale May 2010 -0.0005 
 (0.0214) 
Coastal zone sale June 2010 0.0026 
 (0.0264) 
Coastal zone sale July 2010 -0.0262 
 (0.0338) 
Coastal zone sale August 2010 -0.0528* 
 (0.0314) 
Coastal zone sale September 2010 -0.0821*** 
 (0.0312) 
Coastal zone sale October 2010 -0.0345 
 (0.0400) 
Coastal zone sale November 2010 -0.0286 
 (0.0285) 
Coastal zone sale December 2010 -0.0158 
 (0.0237) 
Coastal zone sale January 2011 0.0328 
 (0.0422) 
Tract Fixed Effects Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y 
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 112,312 
Adj. R2 0.7831 
*** - significant at 0.01;  **- significant at 0.05; *- significant at 0.10 
Robust Standard Errors are Clustered by Census Tract in Parenthesis ( ) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of sale prices in 2014 dollars.  Additional 
controls include the age of the home at the time of sale, a quadratic term for age of sale, the 
total number of bathrooms, the natural log of interior square footage, the natural log of the  
parcel size, an indicator for the presence of a pool, the distance to the nearest urban cluster in 
kilometers, the distance to the nearest primary road in kilometers, an indicator for location on 
the waterfront, an indicator for coastal zone, and monthly indicators for the months shown above. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table B.1: Temporary plans and restrictions implemented according to PPDA Episodes. 
Episode Level Protocols 
Alert -Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 40% week, 20% weekends 
PM10>195 µg/m3 -No use of uncertified residential wood or biomass heating 
 
Pre-Emergency -Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 60% week, 40% weekends 
PM10>240 µg/m3 -Use restrictions on vehicles with catalytic converters: 20% all days 
 -Operation ban on stationary emissions sources contributing 30% of total 
stationary emissions of particulate matter 
 -Potential suspension of Physical Education classes community sports 
 -More intense traffic and public transportation plans in effect 
 -Stricter enforcement on mobile & stationary sources of air pollution 
 -Increased street sweeping and cleaning activities  
 -Increased Metro service  
 -No use of uncertified residential wood or biomass heating 
 
Emergency -Use restriction on vehicles w/o catalytic converters: 80% week, 60% weekends 
PM10>330 µg/m3 -Use restrictions on vehicles with catalytic converters: 40% all days 
 -Operation ban on stationary emissions sources contributing 50% of total 
stationary emissions of particulate matter 
 -Potential suspension of Physical Education classes community sports 
 -More intense traffic and public transportation plans in effect 
 -Stricter enforcement on mobile & stationary sources of air pollution 
 -Increased street sweeping and cleaning activities  
 -Increased Metro service  
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Table B.2: Balance table comparing means for other covariates for treatment and control 
groups matching on pollution and weather in the five days prior, day of and five days 
after an Episode announcement. 
  Means  t-test for  Equal Means 
Lag/Lead Variable Treated Control Percent 
Bias 
t-stat p-value 
-5 Discrete Temp. 49.63 51.48 -28.0 -1.12 0.27 
-4 Discrete Temp. 49.82 51.89 -32.7 -1.33 0.19 
-3 Discrete Temp. 48.70 50.37 -25.3 -1.01 0.32 
-2 Discrete Temp. 49.26 50.96 -24.4 -0.93 0.36 
-1 Discrete Temp. 49.63 51.44 -28.1 -0.96 0.34 
0 Discrete Temp. 50.56 51.30 -11.8 -0.46 0.65 
1 Discrete Temp. 49.44 50.59 -18.6 -0.73 0.47 
2 Discrete Temp. 49.63 50.74 -17.9 -0.60 0.55 
3 Discrete Temp. 49.63 51.52 -30.2 -1.13 0.27 
4 Discrete Temp. 49.82 51.85 -29.8 -1.07 0.29 
5 Discrete Temp. 49.26 51.44 -34.6 -1.21 0.23 
       
-5 Wind Speed 3.18 3.24 -5.0 -0.21 0.84 
-4 Wind Speed 3.75 3.74 0.4 0.02 0.99 
-3 Wind Speed 3.69 3.52 12.7 0.44 0.66 
-2 Wind Speed 2.85 2.76 7.7 0.38 0.71 
-1 Wind Speed 2.78 3.08 -25.4 -1.16 0.25 
0 Wind Speed 3.44 3.52 -6.5 -0.27 0.79 
1 Wind Speed 3.50 3.56 -5.6 -0.22 0.82 
2 Wind Speed 3.59 3.69 -8.0 -0.30 0.77 
3 Wind Speed 3.42 3.28 10.6 0.39 0.70 
4 Wind Speed 3.63 3.80 -15.1 -0.48 0.63 
5 Wind Speed 3.39 3.41 -1.8 -0.07 0.95 
       
-5 Precipitation 0.02 0.02 0.9 0.05 0.96 
-4 Precipitation 0.05 0.06 -7.1 -0.20 0.84 
-3 Precipitation 0.08 0.07 6.5 0.21 0.84 
-2 Precipitation 0.00 0.00 2.7 0.44 0.66 
-1 Precipitation 0.00 0.00 0 0 1.00 
0 Precipitation 0.01 0.02 -10.2 -0.41 0.69 
1 Precipitation 0.02 0.02 -6.7 -0.30 0.77 
2 Precipitation 0.01 0.01 2.1 0.13 0.90 
3 Precipitation 0.02 0.01 6.1 0.37 0.71 
4 Precipitation 0.02 0.01 9.8 0.57 0.57 
5 Precipitation 0.02 0.01 15.4 0.90 0.37 
       
Observations  27 64    
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